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INTRODUCTION
In the past few years, four courts of appeals have applied a presumption
against recognition of a Bivens cause of action1 in dismissing damages suits
alleging constitutional violations arising out of federal officials’ pursuit of
various national security and counterterrorism policies. In each of these
cases, the court’s approach was based on the belief that allowing such suits
to proceed would threaten undue interference with the executive branch’s
conduct of military and national security affairs—interference that should
be tolerated, if ever, only where Congress has expressly so provided. As
Fourth Circuit Judge J. Harvie Wilkinson III explained in declining to
recognize a Bivens claim that would have allowed José Padilla to seek
compensation for his allegedly unconstitutional detention and treatment as
an “enemy combatant,” “To stay the judiciary’s hand in fashioning the
requested Bivens action, it suffices to observe that Padilla’s enemy combatant classification and military detention raise fundamental questions
incident to the conduct of armed conflict, and that Congress . . . has not
provided a damages remedy.”2
The Second Circuit, sitting en banc, used similar reasoning in declining
to recognize the right of Maher Arar to seek compensation for the allegedly
unconstitutional injuries he received at the hands of government officers
arising out of his extraordinary rendition to Syria.3 Other courts have
sounded variations on this theme to preclude relief for claims by, for
example, former Guantánamo detainees4 and U.S. citizens who were
detained and allegedly abused by U.S. military personnel while working as
1 In Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, the Supreme Court
held that an individual had “a cause of action under the Fourth Amendment” and thus that he
could sue directly under the Constitution “to recover money damages for any injuries he has
suffered as a result of the [federal] agents’ violation of the Amendment.” 403 U.S. 388, 397 (1971).
2 Lebron v. Rumsfeld, 670 F.3d 540, 550 (4th Cir.) (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 2751 (2012).
3 Arar v. Ashcroft, 585 F.3d 559 (2d Cir. 2009) (en banc), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 3409 (2010).
4 See, e.g., Rasul v. Myers, 563 F.3d 527, 532 n.5 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (per curiam) (holding in
the alternative that “[t]he danger of obstructing U.S. national security policy” was a “special
factor[]” barring relief).
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military contractors in Iraq.5 In the view of each of these courts, concerns
about judicial interference with national security justified their refusal to
recognize a federal damages remedy for the injuries caused by the defendants’
allegedly unconstitutional conduct.
We argue that the analysis employed by these courts of appeals to determine whether to recognize a Bivens action6 improperly combines two
problematic features. The first is the courts’ conceptualization of the Bivens
question as a choice between recognizing a Bivens action and leaving the
plaintiff with no damages remedy at all. Because the reasons that led the
courts to decline to recognize a Bivens action are reasons to preclude all
judicial involvement in the cases, these courts clearly understood the choice
before them as “Bivens or nothing.” The second problematic feature is the
courts’ application of what the Arar court described as a “remarkably low”
standard for declining to recognize a Bivens action.7 In the words of the Arar
court, all that is necessary to justify a decision not to recognize a Bivens
claim is that the court have reason to “pause.”8 Considered separately, these
two features of the courts’ analysis are both highly problematic. When
combined, they produce a wholly insupportable approach to the Bivens
question.
The four appellate courts’ conceptualization of the Bivens question as
“Bivens or nothing” is decidedly at odds with the way the Supreme Court
understood the Bivens question in Bivens itself. It was common ground
among the Justices and the litigants in Bivens that, in the absence of a
federal cause of action, persons harmed by federal officials’ constitutional
violations would be able to pursue an action for damages under state law.
Consistent with a long history of recognizing common law remedies for
constitutional violations, the Bivens Court understood the question before it
to be whether common law remedies should be supplemented with a federal
damages remedy. Justice Brennan’s opinion for the majority ultimately held

5 See, e.g., Doe v. Rumsfeld, 683 F.3d 390, 394-97 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (rejecting the availability
of a Bivens remedy when such a remedy would require scrutiny of military conduct and sensitive
information). As this Article went to press, the Seventh Circuit, sitting en banc, reached a similar
conclusion, holding in Vance v. Rumsfeld that Bivens remedies are categorically unavailable for
“damages against soldiers . . . who abusively interrogate or mistreat military prisoners, or fail to
prevent improper detention and interrogation.” 701 F.3d 193, 195 (7th Cir. 2012) (en banc).
6 We call this question the “Bivens question.”
7 585 F.3d at 574; see also Lebron, 670 F.3d at 548 (“The Bivens cause of action is not amenable
to casual extension, but rather is subject to a strict test . . . .”) (citation omitted) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
8 585 F.3d at 574.
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that state court remedies were inadequate, not that they were unavailable.9
Even the dissenters, who insisted that the recognition of a new federal cause
of action was a matter for Congress, understood the question to be whether
state law remedies should continue to be the exclusive remedies for constitutional violations by federal officials.10 None of the Justices in Bivens
equated the lack of a federal cause of action with functional immunity from
suit. As the Court understood the Bivens question in Bivens itself, the choice
before it was “Bivens or (only) state law.”
Unlike the contemporary courts of appeals’ conceptualization of the
Bivens question as “Bivens or nothing,” their application of a “remarkably
low” standard for nonrecognition of a Bivens claim has some (albeit slender)
grounding in the Bivens opinion. That grounding, however, is tied to the
Bivens Court’s understanding of the Bivens question as “Bivens or state law.”
The court in Arar derived its low standard from the Bivens Court’s suggestion that nonrecognition of a Bivens action would be proper if there were
“special factors counseling hesitation.” “Hesitation,” the court wrote in
Arar, “is a pause, not a full stop, or an abstention. . . . ‘Hesitation’ is
‘counseled’ whenever thoughtful discretion would pause even to consider.”11
For this reason, the court of appeals concluded, the threshold for declining
to recognize a Bivens claim is a “remarkably low” one.12
The Bivens Court’s formulation of the question as whether “hesitation”
was counseled reflects its understanding of the question before it as whether
to recognize a new federal cause of action to supplement existing remedies.
Given the Court’s recognition of the long history of affording common law
remedies to victims of federal officials’ unconstitutional conduct, the Court
could not have protected federal officials from all judicial interference—as
the court of appeals in Arar purported to do—merely by “hesitating” to act.
Protecting federal officials from all judicial interference requires the elimination of existing nonfederal remedies, and the elimination of such preexisting legal remedies involves not just a negative “stay[ing]” of “the judiciary’s
hand,” as the Fourth Circuit put it in Lebron,13 but the affirmative preemption or displacement of state law remedies. Taking away otherwise available
9

See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 394

(1971).
10 See, e.g., id. at 415-16, 422-24 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (discussing the shortfalls of the federal
remedy and envisioning roles for both federal and state alternative remedy schemes); id. at 429
(Black, J., dissenting) (“The task of evaluating the pros and cons of creating judicial remedies for
particular wrongs is a matter for Congress and the legislatures of the States.”).
11 Arar, 585 F.3d at 574.
12 Id.
13 Lebron v. Rumsfeld, 670 F.3d 540, 550 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 2751 (2012).
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remedies would require an affirmative act of federal lawmaking; mere
“hesitation” to make new law would not accomplish the task.
Thus, the “remarkably low” standard that the courts of appeals have
derived from Bivens is directly linked to the Bivens Court’s understanding of
the Bivens question as “Bivens or state law.” Yet if the courts of appeals had
so understood the Bivens question, they could not have based their nonrecognition of a Bivens claim on the need to protect federal officials in
national security cases from judicial interference. If anything, such national
security concerns would have led the courts of appeals to prefer a federal
remedial regime over one based on state law.
Indeed, we think that recognition that nonfederal remedies would exist
whether or not a Bivens claim were recognized should generally lead courts
to be less hesitant to recognize a federal cause of action against federal
officials. Federal officials have a right to remove suits against them from
state to federal courts upon the assertion of federal defenses.14 Thus, even
state causes of action against them will usually be adjudicated in the federal
courts. As a result, recognition of a federal cause of action will not increase
the caseload of the federal courts. At the same time, a federal remedial
regime would be easier for the federal courts to administer, and it could be
tailored more closely to the policies underlying the relevant constitutional
provisions. (In the case of federal contractors, on the other hand, the costs
and benefits of recognizing a federal cause of action play out differently.
Because federal contractors do not have a general right to remove state law
claims against them,15 recognition of a federal cause of action would increase
the federal caseload. Given this higher cost, the Court has properly required
a stronger showing that state remedies against such defendants would be
inadequate.16)
14 See 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a) (2006); see also Mesa v. California, 489 U.S. 121, 139 (1989) (holding that a federal officer can remove under § 1442(a) once he avers a federal defense).
15 Contractors would be able to remove suits arising under state law if (1) complete diversity
exists; and (2) the contractor is not a local defendant. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b)(2).
16 See, e.g., Minneci v. Pollard, 132 S. Ct. 617, 620 (2012) (“Because we believe that in the
circumstances present here state tort law authorizes adequate alternative damages actions—actions
that provide both significant deterrence and compensation—we cannot [infer a Bivens remedy].”);
Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 72-73 (2001) (noting the availability of a conventional
negligence remedy in a suit against private prison contractors).
The analysis in the text leaves out of the equation (as the courts of appeals appear to have
done) the constitutional need for some remedy to deter violations of the Constitution by federal
officials and to compensate victims of such violations. When this additional consideration is taken
into account (as we think it should be), the absence of a state remedy would, of course, counsel in
favor of recognition of a federal remedy. This Article does not attempt an exhaustive examination
of the constitutional questions, but we do bring constitutional concerns into the analysis in Part IV
as an important reason to construe the Westfall Act as either preserving state remedies or as
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In short, the courts of appeals have committed a fundamental error in
combining the “Bivens or nothing” understanding of the Bivens question
with a “remarkably low” standard for declining to recognize a Bivens
action—unless, sometime after the Bivens decision, state tort remedies for
injuries caused by federal officials’ unconstitutional conduct became unavailable either through legislation or judicial decision. As we show below, such
remedies did not become unavailable through judicial decision.
The claim that state tort remedies became unavailable through legislation is more plausible. In 1988, Congress passed the Westfall Act, which is
widely understood to have preempted all state tort remedies against federal
officials acting within the scope of their authority.17 At the same time, the
Act expressly preserved suits “brought for a violation of the Constitution,”18
an exemption that is widely thought to have preserved only Bivens claims.19
Although the courts of appeals in the cases discussed above did not rely on
the Westfall Act, it might be argued that the prevailing understanding of
that Act justified those courts’ conception of the Bivens question as “Bivens
or nothing.”
We are not convinced. First, the Act’s text does not exempt just Bivens
claims. It exempts all suits “brought for a violation of the Constitution.”
This text is capacious enough to preserve state law remedies against federal
officials who violate the Constitution, which the Supreme Court had
recently described as the “traditional means” for obtaining redress for
constitutional violations.20 The Act’s legislative history confirms that the
Act “would not affect the ability of victims of constitutional torts to seek
personal redress from Federal employees who allegedly violate their
Constitutional rights.”21 Thus, we think that the better interpretation of the
Act is that it does not preempt state law remedies against federal officials for
injuries caused by conduct that violates the Constitution.

authorizing the courts to recognize a federal cause of action in circumstances in which state law
remedies would previously have existed.
17 See Federal Employees Liability Reform and Tort Compensation Act of 1988 (Westfall
Act), Pub. L. No. 100-694, § 5, 102 Stat. 4563, 4564 (amending 28 U.S.C. § 2679(b)).
18 Id.
19 See, e.g., Pollard, 132 S. Ct. at 623 (“Prisoners ordinarily cannot bring state-law tort actions
against employees of the Federal Government.” (citing Westfall Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671,
2679(b)(1))).
20 Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 507 n.34 (1978).
21 H.R. REP. NO. 100-700, at 6 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5945, 5949-50.

2013]

State Law and the Bivens Question

515

We recognize, however, that the lower courts and most scholars and
practitioners have read the Act to preempt such remedies,22 a reading that
the Supreme Court in Minneci v. Pollard recently endorsed, albeit without
analysis.23 If the Act is read to preempt preexisting state tort remedies for
conduct that violates the Constitution, however, we think that it must also
be read to preclude application of the “remarkably low” standard applied by
the courts of appeals to decline to recognize Bivens claims in the cases
discussed above. In light of the availability of common law remedies for
injuries caused through constitutional violations by federal officials at the
time of the Westfall Act’s enactment, Congress’s intent not to affect the
ability of victims of constitutional violations to seek redress for those
violations requires the conclusion that the previously available remedies
remain available either as state law remedies or as federal remedies. For this
and other reasons we discuss below (including the need to avoid constitutional problems), if the Westfall Act is construed to preempt state law
remedies, then it must also be construed to preserve the previously available
remedies as federal remedies.
We thus conclude that the Westfall Act either preserves state law remedies for injuries caused by federal officials’ violations of the Constitution—
in which case the courts of appeals erred in conceiving of the Bivens question as “Bivens or nothing”—or it legislatively authorizes a robust Bivens
action encompassing at least the sorts of remedies previously available
under the common law—in which case the courts of appeals are wrong to
apply a “remarkably low” standard for declining to recognize a Bivens claim.
By combining the “Bivens or nothing” conceptualization of the question
with a “remarkably low” standard for nonrecognition of a Bivens claim, the
courts of appeals have turned the law in force when Bivens was decided
entirely on its head.
We develop these arguments as follows:
In Part I, we describe in greater detail the decisions that reflect the
approach that we regard as mistaken, and we explicate our critique. As we
make clear in this Part, we do not deny that the national security concerns
that drove the courts of appeals to decline to recognize a Bivens claim might,
in some cases, legitimately support the conclusion that such claims should
not be permitted to proceed. Our claim, rather, is that these concerns are
not relevant to whether a Bivens claim should be recognized. There are a
22 See, e.g., James E. Pfander & David Baltmanis, Rethinking Bivens: Legitimacy and Constitutional Adjudication, 98 GEO. L.J. 117, 123 (2009) (“[T]oday, it has become ‘Bivens or nothing’ for
those who seek to vindicate constitutional rights.”).
23 See supra note 19.
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number of existing doctrines, such as official immunity and the state secrets
privilege, that serve to limit or preclude the availability of remedies against
government officials in both state and federal courts. National security
concerns might be relevant to the application of one or more of these
doctrines. Or, as separate panels of the D.C. and Fourth Circuits have held
in dismissing state law suits arising out of alleged torture by military
contractors overseas, the courts of appeals could conceivably recognize a
new federal common law defense barring relief under any cause of action in
any case implicating the concerns that these courts shoehorned into the
Bivens analysis.24 In deciding the cases on these grounds, however, the
courts would not have been able to rest a decision in favor of the defendant
officer on their reluctance to create a new federal remedy. They would not
have been able to hold the defendant to the “remarkably low” burden of
persuasion that the Arar court applied in determining whether to recognize
a Bivens claim.25 To the contrary, since official immunity and the state
secrets privilege are themselves regarded as federal common law doctrines,
reluctance to make new law should have worked against the defendants
seeking expansion of those doctrines or the creation of new defenses.
Parts II and III focus on the pre–Westfall Act approach to remedying
injuries caused by the unconstitutional conduct of federal officials. Because
Congress, in enacting the Westfall Act, did not intend to affect the redress
available to victims of constitutional violations, understanding the traditional means of remedying such violations is crucial to the proper interpretation of that Act. Part II examines the theories under which victims of
constitutional violations obtained damages against federal officials prior to
Bivens. For most of our history, tort claims against federal officers were
grounded in the “general” common law, which did not vary from state to
state. Moreover, once Congress authorized federal officials sued in state
court to remove such suits to federal court,26 the question of remedies
would often be decided by federal courts, which, before Erie Railroad v.

24 See Al Shimari v. CACI Int’l, Inc. (Al Shimari I), 658 F.3d 413, 420 (4th Cir. 2011) (holding that the combatant activities exception to the Federal Tort Claims Act, which would bar such
claims against U.S. servicemembers, authorizes federal courts to displace state law tort suits
against federal military contractors arising out of the torture of detainees at Abu Ghraib), vacated,
(Al Shimari II), 679 F.3d 205 (4th Cir. 2012) (en banc); Saleh v. Titan Corp., 580 F.3d 1, 9 (D.C.
Cir. 2009) (same as Al Shimari I). The panel decision in Al Shimari was subsequently vacated by
the en banc Fourth Circuit on the ground that the court of appeals lacked interlocutory appellate
jurisdiction. See Al Shimari II, 679 F.3d at 224. But see id. at 225-30 (Wilkinson, J., dissenting)
(endorsing the three-judge panel’s analysis of the federal-contractor defense).
25 See supra notes 7-8 and accompanying text.
26 See 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1) (2006).
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Tompkins,27 did not follow state court decisions on matters of general law.
After Erie, the existing general common law of remedies for constitutional
violations came to be treated as state law. The question the Court answered
affirmatively in Bivens was whether these remedies should be supplemented
with a new judicially created federal common law cause of action.
Part III turns to the Supreme Court’s understanding of the Bivens question in Bivens itself and in subsequent cases. This Part demonstrates that
neither Bivens nor any of the Court’s more recent Bivens decisions can fairly
be read to have preempted state law remedies against federal officials as a
matter of federal common law. There is stray language in a few opinions
that seems to overlook the fact that nonrecognition of a Bivens action would
leave state causes of action in place, but, on the whole, the Supreme Court’s
decisions are consistent with its initial understanding of the Bivens question—and with the general structure of remedies that had prevailed prior to
1971. This conclusion is confirmed by decisions addressing the scope of the
official immunity enjoyed by federal officials in suits alleging a constitutional
violation. Part III concludes that state law remedies for injuries caused by
the unconstitutional conduct of federal officials—the “traditional means” of
seeking compensation for such injuries28—remained alive and well at the
time of the enactment of the Westfall Act in 1988.
Part IV examines how, if at all, the Westfall Act changed the nature of
the Bivens question. The Act generally immunizes federal employees from
private lawsuits based on acts performed within the scope of their employment; subject to numerous limits and exceptions, the statute converts such
grievances into a Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) suit against the United
States.29 But the Westfall Act also explicitly preserves actions “brought for
a violation of the Constitution of the United States.”30 The Court in
Minneci v. Pollard recently endorsed the prevailing reading of the Westfall
Act as preempting state law remedies against federal officials, even for
conduct that violates the Constitution.31 Read this way, the Act leaves the
federal Bivens action as the sole remedy against the official. If so, then
nonrecognition of a Bivens claim would indeed be the equivalent of recognition of an immunity of such officials from suit for their unconstitutional acts.
As already noted, we think that the Westfall Act is better read as preserving state law remedies for injuries caused by the unconstitutional
27
28
29
30
31

304 U.S. 64 (1938).
Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 507 n.34 (1978).
See 28 U.S.C. § 2679(b).
Id. § 2679(b)(2)(A).
See 132 S. Ct. 617, 623 (2012) (“Prisoners ordinarily cannot bring state-law tort actions
against employees of the Federal Government.” (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2679(b)(1))).
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conduct of federal officials. If the Act is read to preempt such remedies,
however, we think it must also be read as authorizing a robust approach to
Bivens under which traditional common law remedies would presumptively
be available. Thus, either the Bivens question remains “Bivens or state law,”
as it was before the Westfall Act, or the Act precludes the hesitant approach
to recognizing Bivens claims reflected in the court of appeals cases discussed
above. If interpreted to preempt state law remedies without authorizing
equivalent federal remedies, the Westfall Act would have worked a silent
but dramatic change in the structure of damages remedies for federal
constitutional violations—and raised serious constitutional questions in the
process.
I. THE BIVENS QUESTION IN CONTEMPORARY
NATIONAL SECURITY CASES
In Bivens, the Supreme Court for the first time recognized a federal
cause of action for damages against federal law enforcement officials who
violate the Fourth Amendment.32 At the same time, the Court suggested
that “special factors” might “counsel[] hesitation” in recognizing such a
cause of action in other contexts.33 Since then, the Court has decided a
series of cases posing the question whether Bivens should be “extended” to
new contexts.34 Although the Court has shifted over time in its willingness
to extend Bivens, it has generally adhered to its initial conceptualization of
the Bivens question. As understood by all of the Justices in Bivens and (with
a few ambiguous exceptions) in all subsequent cases, the question has always
been whether to recognize a federal cause of action for damages for constitutional violations by federal officials or instead to leave the availability of
32
33
34

403 U.S. 388, 397 (1971).
Id. at 396.
See, e.g., Wilkie v. Robbins, 551 U.S. 537, 550 (2007) (“We have seen no case for extending
Bivens to claims against federal agencies or against private prisons.” (citations omitted)); Corr.
Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 63 (2001) (declining to extend Bivens to allow recovery
against a private corporation operating a halfway house under contract with the Federal Bureau of
Prisons); FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 486 (1994) (“An extension of Bivens to agencies of the
Federal Government is not supported by the logic of Bivens itself.”).
We recognize that it will often be contested whether a case requires the “extension” of Bivens
to a “new context” or instead merely the application of Bivens within a context in which a Bivens
action has already been held to exist. We do not address how to determine whether an extension
of Bivens is required in any given case. Rather, we address how the question should be approached
once it has been framed that way. We also distinguish the “Bivens question,” as framed above,
from the related though distinct question of whether state law claims remain available in a given
context once a Bivens action has been held to exist in that context. For discussion of the latter
question, see infra text accompanying notes 186-98.
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damages for such violations entirely to state law (or another existing federal
remedial regime).35 Thus, in the absence of another available federal
remedial regime, the alternative to recognition of a Bivens action has always
been understood to be to leave the nature and scope of the damage remedy
for federal officials’ violations of the Constitution to state law. If the Bivens
question is “Bivens or state law,” as it has been understood by the Supreme
Court since the Bivens decision, then it follows that a “special factor[]
counselling hesitation”36 is a reason to prefer a regime in which the susceptibility of federal officers to damages claims for their violations of the
Constitution is governed by state law.37 In light of the existence of nonfederal
remedies, the need to protect federal officials from judicial interference
would not support the refusal to recognize a Bivens claim.
A. Bivens and Post-9/11 National Security Litigation
Although the Supreme Court has not veered from this understanding of
the Bivens question, the lower courts appear to be operating under a very
different conception in some notable recent cases alleging constitutional
violations committed in the war on terror (and in some nonterrorism cases,
as well). For example, in its widely noticed decision in Arar v. Ashcroft, the
en banc Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit found “special factors”
that counseled against recognition of a Bivens claim that would have allowed
Maher Arar to seek damages from the various federal officials he had sued.38
His suit alleged that those officials had detained him and subjected him to
coercive interrogation in New York before transporting him against his will
and without his knowledge to Syria, where he was detained and tortured by
Syrian officials.39 Arar argued that these federal officers violated his substantive due process rights under the Fifth Amendment.40 As discussed in
greater detail in Part II, the alleged acts of the federal officials would also
have stated colorable claims under state tort law.
35
36
37

See infra Section III.B.
Bivens, 403 U.S. at 396.
As noted here, and as discussed more fully in Part III, the Court also considers the availability of other federal statutory remedies in deciding whether to recognize a Bivens claim.
Nevertheless, for the sake of simplicity, we describe the contending versions of the Bivens question
as “Bivens or state law” and “Bivens or nothing.” Those were the options as they were understood,
respectively, in Bivens itself and in the contemporary national security cases we discuss, in which
other federal remedies were not available.
38 585 F.3d 559, 565 (2d Cir. 2009) (en banc).
39 Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial at paras. 1-5, Arar v. Ashcroft, 414 F. Supp. 2d 250
(E.D.N.Y. 2006) (No. 04-0249) [hereinafter Arar Complaint].
40 Arar, 585 F.3d at 563. The majority assumed without deciding that Arar had substantive
due process rights. See id. at 569.

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

520

[Vol. 161: 509

In considering whether Arar had stated a Bivens claim, all of the judges
viewed the question before them as whether any cause of action for damages
existed. The judges in the majority declined to recognize a Bivens claim,
citing as “special factors counseling hesitation” the sensitive foreign policy
concerns raised by the action,41 as well as the difficulties that would be posed
by the classified nature of some of the evidence that would necessarily have
to be presented.42 Their reasoning shows that they viewed the alternative to
recognition of a Bivens claim as the denial of any claim, as the concerns that
led them to deny a Bivens claim would have been equally implicated had
Arar brought a state tort claim against the defendants for false imprisonment or assault. Although the four dissenters would have recognized a
Bivens claim, they too seemed to regard the options as “Bivens or nothing.”43
Arar is perhaps the most notable of the cases adopting this approach to
the Bivens question, but it is not alone. Other lower courts have deployed
similar analyses, both in cases raising national security concerns44 and in
41
42
43

Id. at 573-76.
Id. at 576.
See, e.g., id. at 605 (Sack, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“Arar has no other
remedy for the alleged harms the defendant officers inflicted on him.”); id. at 610 (Parker, J.,
dissenting) (“I write separately to underscore the miscarriage of justice that leaves Arar without a
remedy in our courts.”); id. at 627 (Pooler, J., dissenting) (“Ultimately, the majority concludes
that the Constitution provides Arar no remedy for this wrong, that the judiciary must stay its
hand in enforcing the Constitution because untested national security concerns have been asserted
by the Executive branch.”); id. at 630 (Calabresi, J., dissenting) (decrying “the result that a
person—whom we must assume (a) was totally innocent and (b) was made to suffer excruciatingly
(c) through the misguided deeds of individuals acting under color of federal law—is effectively left
without a U.S. remedy”).
44 For example, the D.C. Circuit invoked “[t]he danger of obstructing U.S. national security
policy” as a special factor counseling hesitation in declining to recognize a Bivens remedy for
claims of torture and other abuse brought by former Guantánamo detainees. See Rasul v. Myers,
563 F.3d 527, 532 n.5 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (per curiam).
In Wilson v. Libby, the D.C. Circuit refused to recognize a Bivens remedy against those responsible for the disclosure of a CIA agent’s covert status. See 535 F.3d 697, 710 (D.C. Cir. 2008). It
noted that, “if we were to create a Bivens remedy, the litigation of the allegations in the amended
complaint would inevitably require judicial intrusion into matters of national security and
sensitive intelligence information.” Id. The D.C. Circuit drew an analogy to the litigation bar
recognized in Totten v. United States, in which the Supreme Court held that no action could be
brought to recover pay allegedly due under an espionage contract between President Lincoln and
the claimant, because “[i]f upon contracts of such a [secret] nature an action against the government could be maintained . . . the whole service in any case, and the manner of its discharge, with
the details of dealings with individuals and officers, might be exposed, to the serious detriment of
the public.” 92 U.S. 105, 106-07 (1875); see Wilson, 535 F.3d at 710. The Wilson court concluded that
“[w]e certainly must hesitate before we allow a judicial inquiry into these allegations that implicate
the job risks and responsibilities of covert CIA agents. . . . [T]he concerns justifying the Totten
doctrine provide further support for our decision that a Bivens cause of action is not warranted.”
535 F.3d at 710.
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cases not raising such concerns.45 Perhaps the most detailed analysis of the
justification for declining to recognize a Bivens remedy came from the
Fourth Circuit, which held in Lebron v. Rumsfeld that José Padilla could not
pursue a Bivens action against the federal officials who ordered his detention
and alleged torture.46 As Judge Wilkinson explained,
Padilla’s complaint seeks quite candidly to have the judiciary review and
disapprove sensitive military decisions made after extensive deliberations
within the executive branch as to what the law permitted, what national
security required, and how best to reconcile competing values. It takes little
enough imagination to understand that a judicially devised damages action
would expose past executive deliberations affecting sensitive matters of
national security to the prospect of searching judicial scrutiny. It would
affect future discussions as well, shadowed as they might be by the thought
that those involved would face prolonged civil litigation and potential personal liability.47

To similar effect is the D.C. Circuit’s decision in Doe v. Rumsfeld.48
There, a U.S. citizen sued various government officials for his allegedly
unlawful detention and treatment arising out of his work as a military
contractor in Iraq.49 The district court denied the government’s motion to
dismiss in part, concluding both that recognition of a Bivens remedy was
appropriate under the unique circumstances of the case50 and that, based on
the facts alleged in Doe’s complaint, the defendants were not entitled to
qualified immunity at least as to Doe’s substantive due process claim.51
With respect to recognition of a Bivens claim, Judge Gwin’s analysis
45 Consider in this regard Benzman v. Whitman, in which the Second Circuit refused to recognize a Bivens remedy for residents of lower Manhattan based on claims that they had been
misled about the air quality after the September 11th attacks. 523 F.3d 119, 126-29 (2d Cir. 2008).
The court’s analysis overlooked the possible availability of state tort remedies, as its refusal to
recognize a Bivens action turned on “the right of federal agencies to make discretionary decisions
when engaged in disaster relief efforts without the fear of judicial second-guessing.” Id. at 126
(citation omitted). Interestingly, the Second Circuit traced that right to “the Stafford Act’s grant
of discretionary function immunity to government officials engaged in administration of the
Disaster Relief Act.” Id. (citing In re World Trade Ctr. Disaster Site Litig., 521 F.3d 169, 192-93
(2d Cir. 2008)). The court of appeals did not explain why the existence of a statutory immunity in
an analogous context counseled against inferring a Bivens remedy, rather than counseling in favor
of recognizing a comparable form of immunity as a federal common law defense that would also
apply in state court.
46 670 F.3d 540, 556 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 2751 (2012).
47 Id. at 551.
48 683 F.3d 390 (D.C. Cir. 2012).
49 Id. at 382.
50 See Doe v. Rumsfeld, 800 F. Supp. 2d 94, 111 (D.D.C. 2011), rev’d, 683 F.3d 390.
51 See id. at 121.
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specifically suggested that the absence of alternative remedies militated in
favor of inferring a Bivens cause of action. He explained that “where the
Supreme Court has declined to recognize a cause of action under Bivens,
that decision has always relied upon the presence of alternative remedies for
the alleged constitutional violation or special factors counseling judicial
hesitation.”52 For this reason, and because a Bivens remedy would not
unduly interfere with military or national security considerations, the
district court allowed the case to proceed.53
On interlocutory appeal,54 the D.C. Circuit reversed.55 Proceeding from
the observation that “[t]he implication of a Bivens action . . . is not something to be undertaken lightly,” Chief Judge Sentelle emphasized that “[t]he
Supreme Court has never implied a Bivens remedy in a case involving the
military, national security, or intelligence.”56 And in Doe’s case particularly,
Doe’s allegations against Secretary Rumsfeld implicate the military
chain of command and the discretion Secretary Rumsfeld and other top
officials gave to [Navy] agents to detain and question potential enemy combatants. . . . Litigation of Doe’s case would require testimony from top military officials as well as forces on the ground, which would detract focus,
resources, and personnel from the mission in Iraq. . . . [A]llowing such an
action would hinder our troops from acting decisively in our nation’s interest
for fear of judicial review of every detention and interrogation.57

A different D.C. Circuit panel framed the point even more succinctly in Ali
v. Rumsfeld: “[A]llowing a Bivens action to be brought against American
military officials engaged in war would disrupt and hinder the ability of our

52 Id. at 106; see also id. at 107 (“Rumsfeld does not argue that remedies outside of Bivens
damages exist for Doe’s alleged constitutional injuries. Nor does the Court find any.” (citations
omitted)).
53 See id. at 107-11 (discussing why there were no “special factors” counseling hesitation).
54 Although it is well settled that “an order rejecting the defense of qualified immunity at
either the dismissal stage or the summary judgment stage is a ‘final’ judgment subject to immediate appeal” under the collateral order doctrine, Behrens v. Pelletier, 516 U.S. 299, 307 (1996)
(emphasis omitted); see also, e.g., Hartman v. Moore, 547 U.S. 250, 257 n.5 (2006), such appeals (1)
do not bring the entire case before the appellate court; and (2) therefore have not usually
encompassed the existence of a viable cause of action (such as Bivens), since appellate jurisdiction
over collateral order appeals is necessarily limited to “issues significantly different from those that
underlie the plaintiff’s basic case,” Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 314 (1995). But see Wilkie v.
Robbins, 551 U.S. 537, 549 n.4 (2007) (holding, without analysis, that an interlocutory qualified
immunity appeal also encompasses the “recognition of the entire cause of action”).
55 Doe, 683 F.3d 390.
56 Id. at 394.
57 Id. at 396.
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armed forces ‘to act decisively and without hesitation in defense of our
liberty and national interests.’”58
Most recently, the Seventh Circuit, sitting en banc, reached a similar—
if more categorical—conclusion in Vance v. Rumsfeld.59 Building on Arar,
Lebron, and Doe, the Vance court concluded that courts should never “create
an extra-statutory right of action for damages against military personnel
who mistreat detainees,” even where those detainees are U.S. citizens with
clearly established constitutional rights.60 Although Chief Judge Easterbrook framed the majority opinion as merely an extension of the Supreme
Court’s prior jurisprudence,61 Judge Hamilton’s dissenting opinion emphasized that “the majority in effect creates a new absolute immunity from
Bivens liability for all members of the U.S. military.62
The courts’ analyses in all of these cases clearly reflect their conceptualization of the issue before them as “Bivens or nothing.” The courts’ national
security concerns would obviously not have justified their nonrecognition of
a federal damages remedy if they had understood state tort remedies to be
available for the same injuries.
B. The Courts’ “Remarkably Low” Standard and Their
Scruples about Judicial Lawmaking
We do not argue that the concerns that led the Second Circuit in Arar,
the Fourth Circuit in Lebron, the D.C. Circuit in Doe and Ali, and the
Seventh Circuit in Vance to decline to recognize a Bivens claim are irrelevant to whether the claims should be allowed to proceed. Our contention,
rather, is that those concerns are not relevant to the decision whether to
recognize a Bivens claim. Instead, they are potentially relevant to questions
of immunity, privilege, or preemption. The latter defenses would bar state
remedies as well, whereas nonrecognition of a Bivens claim would leave them
in place.63
58 649 F.3d 762, 773 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (quoting In re Iraq & Afg. Detainees Litig., 479 F.
Supp. 2d 85, 105 (D.D.C. 2007)).
59 701 F.3d 193 (7th Cir. 2012) (en banc).
60 Id. at *3; see id. at *8 (“We do not think that the plaintiffs’ citizenship is dispositive one
way or the other. . . . The Supreme Court has never suggested that citizenship matters to a claim
under Bivens.”).
61 See id. at *3-8.
62 Id. at *16 (Hamilton, J., dissenting); see also id. at *34 (Williams, J., dissenting) (“[W]e risk
creating a doctrine of constitutional triviality where private actions are permitted only if they
cannot possibly offend anyone anywhere.”).
63 Our analysis in this Part brackets the effect of the Westfall Act. Thus, we assume here that
common law remedies have not been generally preempted by statute. The Westfall Act is the
focus of Part IV.
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Whether these factors are treated as relevant to the existence of a Bivens
claim or instead to the defenses of immunity, privilege, or preemption will
make a very real difference in the courts’ treatment of the issues and,
potentially, the outcome. Specifically, the court’s concerns would have to do
much heavier lifting to justify a dismissal on immunity, privilege, or
preemption grounds than to justify nonrecognition of a Bivens claim.
According to the court in Arar, it takes very little to justify a decision to
decline to recognize a Bivens claim. The court need merely have reason to
“hesitate.”64 As Chief Judge Jacobs wrote, “The only relevant threshold—
that a factor ‘counsels hesitation’—is remarkably low. . . . Hesitation is a
pause, not a full stop, or an abstention. . . . ‘Hesitation’ is ‘counseled’
whenever thoughtful discretion would pause even to consider.”65 The
court’s analysis in this respect was based on the suggestion in Bivens that it
might be appropriate to decline to recognize a federal damage remedy if
there are “special factors counselling hesitation.”66 Although we do not
think that the Bivens Court had in mind a standard as weak as the one
applied in the cases discussed above, the Supreme Court’s subsequent
jurisprudence does give greater prominence, and broader scope, to this
language from Bivens.
The weakness of this standard derives from the courts’ reluctance to
engage in judicial lawmaking. Consistent with the view of the Bivens
dissenters,67 the Bivens line of cases has come to be seen as an example of

64

Arar v. Ashcroft, 585 F.3d 559, 574 (2d Cir. 2009) (en banc), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 3409

(2010).
65
66

Id. at 574.
Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 396
(1971). The Arar court’s conclusion in this respect was based upon the inference that if the absence
of “special factors counselling hesitation” militated in favor of—or at least permitted—recognizing
a cause of action directly under the Constitution, then the presence of such factors must militate
against implying such a cause of action.
67 See id. at 418 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (“Today’s holding seeks to fill one of the gaps of
the suppression doctrine—at the price of impinging on the legislative and policy functions that the
Constitution vests in Congress.”); id. at 428 (Black, J., dissenting) (“[T]he fatal weakness in the
Court’s judgment is that neither Congress nor the State of New York has enacted legislation
creating such a right of action. For us to do so is, in my judgment, an exercise of power that the
Constitution does not give us.”); id. at 430 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (“[I]t is the Congress and
not this Court that should act.”); see also Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 34 (1980) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting) (“In my view, it is ‘an exercise of power that the Constitution does not give us’ for this
Court to infer a private civil damages remedy from the [Constitution]. The creation of such
remedies is a task that is more appropriately viewed as falling within the legislative sphere of
authority.” (citation omitted)).
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federal common lawmaking.68 As such, it is subject to a criticism directed at
all federal common lawmaking—namely, the claim that such law is illegitimate because only Congress has the power to make law.69 When Bivens was
decided, the Court was less scrupulous about federal common lawmaking in
general, and about recognition of implied rights of action in particular.70
But the Court has steadily become more hostile to the implication of
remedies without clear congressional direction; it views the creation of such
remedies as a matter for Congress.71 The Court’s retrenchment with respect
to Bivens reflects a similar belief that recognizing new rights of action for
constitutional violations is primarily a legislative function.72
In later cases, the Justices favoring a robust approach to Bivens remedies
resisted the characterization of Bivens claims as the product of federal
common lawmaking. In Davis v. Passman, for example, Justice Brennan’s
opinion for the Court portrayed the Judiciary’s recognition of a right of
action under the Constitution as part and parcel of the Judiciary’s proper
role in enforcing the Constitution.73 Even the Justices who have counseled a
68 For example, Bivens and its progeny appear in the “Federal Common Law” chapter of the
leading Federal Courts casebook. See RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART & WECHSLER’S
THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 726-42 (6th ed. 2009).
69 See Bradford R. Clark, Federal Common Law: A Structural Reinterpretation, 144 U. PA. L.
REV. 1245, 1248-49 (1996) (“Such open-ended lawmaking by courts raises constitutional concerns
because it bears a troublesome resemblance to the exercise of legislative power—power apparently
reserved by the Constitution to the political branches.”); Thomas W. Merrill, The Common Law
Powers of Federal Courts, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 2 (1985) (“Generally speaking, federal common law
has been perceived as raising issues of federalism and separation of powers . . . .”); Thomas W.
Merrill, The Judicial Prerogative, 12 PACE L. REV. 327, 344 (1992) (“[T]here is something anomalous about federal common law, and . . . it fits uncomfortably within the general jurisprudential
assumptions about the role of federal courts under the Constitution.”).
70 See Bivens, 403 U.S. at 402, 406-08 (Harlan, J., concurring in the judgment) (relying in
part on the judiciary’s then-receptive approach to the implication of private rights of action under
statutes).
71 See, e.g., Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 285 (2002); Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S.
275, 286-87 (2001).
72 See, e.g., Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412, 429 (1988) (“Whether or not we believe that
its response was the best response, Congress is the body charged with making the inevitable
compromises required in the design of a massive and complex welfare benefits program.”); Bush v.
Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 390 (1983) (“[W]e decline to create a new substantive legal liability without
legislative aid and as at the common law, because we are convinced that Congress is in a better
position to decide whether or not the public interest would be served by creating it.” (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 75 (2001)
(Scalia, J., concurring) (“Bivens is a relic of the heady days in which this Court assumed common
law powers to create causes of action—decreeing them to be ‘implied’ by the mere existence of a
statutory or constitutional prohibition.”). For criticism of the tendency to treat Bivens as
implicating the same considerations as implied statutory causes of action, see generally Stephen I.
Vladeck, Bivens Remedies and the Myth of the “Heady Days,” 8 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 513 (2011).
73 442 U.S. 228, 241-42 (1979).
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more restrained approach to judicial implication of private rights of action
under federal statutes have recognized that there is greater justification for a
more creative judicial role in recognizing remedies for violations of the
Constitution.74 But as noted, a more cautious approach to Bivens eventually
took hold, reflecting the belief that recognition of new federal rights of
action is properly a legislative function.
As we discuss in Part III, however, even the Justices most troubled by
judicial lawmaking recognized that common law remedies typically remained
available. Indeed, it is in the opinions of these Justices that we find the
clearest articulation of the view that the alternative to recognition of a
Bivens claim is the exclusivity of state common law as the source of the
damage remedy against federal officials.75 It is easy to see why: federal
officials had been subject to common law remedies for their unconstitutional
conduct since the beginning of our nation’s history.76 Judges who object to
judicial lawmaking would presumably object with equal fervor to the
displacement of these remedies by any means other than legislation. Judges
and scholars who question the legitimacy of federal common lawmaking do
so on the ground that such lawmaking makes it too easy to displace state
law.77 The constitutional structure, they argue (along with the Rules of
Decision Act),78 presupposes that state law will apply unless displaced
through the Article I legislative process. The federal legislative process was,
in turn, made as onerous as it was in order to protect the states from having
74 See Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 733 n.3 (1979) (Powell, J., dissenting) (“[T]his
Court’s traditional responsibility to safeguard constitutionally protected rights, as well as the freer
hand we necessarily have in the interpretation of the Constitution, permits greater judicial
creativity with respect to implied constitutional causes of action. Moreover, the implication of
remedies to enforce constitutional provisions does not interfere with the legislative process in the
way that the implication of remedies from statutes can.”). As Justice Harlan observed in Bivens,

[I]t would be at least anomalous to conclude that the federal judiciary—while competent to choose among the range of traditional judicial remedies to implement statutory
and common-law policies, and even to generate substantive rules governing primary
behavior in furtherance of broadly formulated policies articulated by statutes or
Constitution—is powerless to accord a damages remedy to vindicate social policies
which, by virtue of their inclusion in the Constitution, are aimed predominantly at
restraining the Government as an instrument of the popular will.
403 U.S. at 403-04 (Harlan, J., concurring in the judgment).
75 See Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 42 (1980); infra text accompanying note 209.
76 See generally infra Part II.
77 See sources cited supra note 69.
78 See 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (2006) (“The laws of the several states, except where the Constitution or treaties of the United States or Acts of Congress otherwise require or provide, shall be
regarded as rules of decision in civil actions in the courts of the United States, in cases where they
apply.”).
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their laws displaced too easily. Federal common lawmaking is problematic
because it circumvents the “carefully wrought” procedures set up by the
Constitution for displacing state law.79 From this perspective, the displacement of common law remedies against federal officials would be just as
much a legislative function as the creation of new federal rights of action,
and the judicial displacement of such actions would have been just as
objectionable. Judges who object to judicial lawmaking in general would
insist that it is presumptively for Congress to change the legal status quo,
and, as discussed in Part II, the status quo at the time of Bivens recognized
the availability of common law remedies against federal officials.
Of course, several (primarily judge-made) doctrines might nevertheless
foreclose recovery in any given case, depending on the facts. First, the
official might be entitled to official immunity. The Court in Bivens recognized that the federal cause of action would be subject to such immunities,80
and it has elsewhere made clear that the same is true of state tort actions.81
Today, official immunity protects executive officials from damages liability
unless they violate “clearly established” federal law.82 Second, evidentiary
privileges, such as those relating to state secrets, may apply in suits arising
out of clandestine governmental programs.83 An evidentiary privilege based
upon state secrets is similarly applicable whether the right of action is based
on federal or state law.84 Third, state tort actions may be preempted by
federal statute. For example, the Public Service Health Act, 42 U.S.C.
§ 233(a), provides that

79 Clark, supra note 69, at 1269. For elaboration of these objections to federal common lawmaking, see, in addition to the sources cited supra note 69, Bradford R. Clark, Separation of Powers
as a Safeguard of Federalism, 79 TEX. L. REV. 1321 (2001). For a response, see Carlos Manuel
Vázquez, The Separation of Powers as a Safeguard of Nationalism, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1601 (2008).
80 See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388,
397-98 (1971) (“This question was not passed upon by the Court of Appeals, and accordingly we
do not consider it here.”).
81 See, e.g., Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 640 (1980) (“[T]his Court has never indicated
that qualified immunity is relevant to the existence of the plaintiff’s cause of action; instead we
have described it as a defense available to the official in question.”); see also infra Section III.C.
82 See, e.g., Camreta v. Greene, 131 S. Ct. 2020, 2032 (2011) (“With the law thus clearly established, officials who conduct [a warrantless] interview will not receive immunity . . . .”).
83 See, e.g., Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 614 F.3d 1070, 1092-93 (9th Cir. 2010) (en
banc) (dismissing case “at the outset” under the state secrets privilege after finding a “painful
conflict between human rights and national security”), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 2442 (2011).
84 See, e.g., Crater Corp. v. Lucent Techs., Inc., 423 F.3d 1260, 1269 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (remanding for determination of whether the application of state secrets privilege would preclude a
state law claim from going forward).

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

528

[Vol. 161: 509

[t]he [Federal Tort Claims Act85] remedy against the United States . . . for
damage for personal injury, including death, resulting from the performance of medical, surgical, dental, or related functions . . . by any commissioned officer or employee of the Public Health Service while acting within
the scope of his office or employment, shall be exclusive of any other civil
action or proceeding by reason of the same subject-matter against the officer
or employee . . . .86

The Supreme Court in Hui v. Castaneda held that this provision preempts
Bivens claims against such officials,87 and the statute’s plain text would
equally cover analogous state tort remedies.88
In theory, state tort claims might also be displaced by federal common
law, or even by the Constitution. The Supreme Court has found state tort
remedies against federal contractors to be displaced as a matter of federal
common law under certain limited circumstances.89 Similarly, scholars have
argued that state criminal prosecution of federal officials should sometimes
be held to be preempted by the Supremacy Clause.90 Notably, however,
these scholars were writing in response to a court decision declining to find
such preemption.91 We are unaware of Supreme Court decisions holding
common law remedies against federal officials to be displaced as a matter of

85
86

See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2672–2680 (2006); infra notes 297-305 and accompanying text.
42 U.S.C. § 233(a). Compare id., with 10 U.S.C. §§ 1054(a), 1089(a), 22 U.S.C. § 2702(a),
38 U.S.C. § 7316(a), and 51 U.S.C. § 20137(a).
87 130 S. Ct 1845, 1852 (2010).
88 As discussed in Part III, infra, the Court, citing Congress’s establishment of a “comprehensive internal system of justice to regulate military life,” has held that Bivens actions are
unavailable to servicemembers injured by the unconstitutional actions of their superiors. United
States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669, 679 (1987) (quoting Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 302
(1983)); cf. Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 146 (1950) (“[T]he Government is not liable
under the Federal Tort Claims Act for injuries to servicemen where the injuries arise out of or are
in the course of activity incident to service.”). If the regulatory system is comprehensive, it
presumably preempts state law remedies as well. Cf., e.g., Estate of Himsel v. Alaska, 36 P.3d 35,
45 (Alaska 2001) (applying the Feres doctrine, which bars FTCA suits arising out of military
service, in state court); Mangan v. Cline, 411 N.W.2d 9, 12 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987) (same); Wade
v. Gill, 889 S.W.2d 208, 214 (Tenn. 1994) (same); Newth v. Adjutant Gen.’s Dep’t, 883 S.W.2d
356, 360 (Tex. Ct. App. 1994) (same); Nyberg v. State Military Dep’t, 65 P.3d 1241, 1249-50
(Wyo. 2003) (same).
89 See Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 504-05, 505 n.1 (1988) (recognizing a
limited federal common law defense for contractors who design products for the military).
90 E.g., Seth P. Waxman & Trevor W. Morrison, What Kind of Immunity? Federal Officers,
State Criminal Law, and the Supremacy Clause, 112 YALE L.J. 2195, 2234 (2003).
91 See Idaho v. Horiuchi, 215 F.3d 986, 997 (9th Cir. 2000) (distinguishing “Supremacy
Clause immunity,” which “protect[s] a federal agent from being held to answer to state laws,” from
qualified immunity), vacated, 253 F.3d 359 (9th Cir.) (en banc), vacated as moot, 266 F.3d 979 (9th
Cir. 2001) (en banc).
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federal common law or under the Constitution (as opposed to by statute).92
Indeed, such remedies have been available in the past even for constitutional
violations occurring in war.93 Nevertheless, it is conceivable that the courts
might find such displacement with respect to suits implicating national
security in particular ways, as they have done in state tort suits against
military contractors.94
This is not the place to explore the scope of these doctrines or their applicability to the facts of the cases under discussion. Our point, rather, is
that these are the doctrines that address whether damages actions should
proceed against federal officials. Immunity doctrine, in particular, reflects
“an attempt to balance competing values: not only the importance of a
damages remedy to protect the rights of citizens, but also ‘the need to
protect officials who are required to exercise their discretion and the related
public interest in encouraging the vigorous exercise of official authority.’”95
In performing this balance, the Court explicitly takes “national security”
and “foreign policy” concerns into account where appropriate.96 By considering these factors instead in deciding whether to recognize a Bivens cause
of action, the courts of appeals have pretermitted the proper analysis.
Rather than grappling with the relevant concerns on both sides of the
balance, as the Supreme Court has instructed, the courts of appeals’ “remarkably low” standard effectively gives controlling weight to one side. If the
factors that led the courts in these cases to deny a Bivens claim had been
considered in connection with these other doctrines, the courts could not
have ruled for the defendants merely because of a disinclination to engage
92 Except insofar as federal common law immunities or evidentiary privileges might be understood as partially displacing state tort claims. Cf. infra note 212 (discussing the Feres doctrine).
93 See Trevor W. Morrison, Suspension and the Extrajudicial Constitution, 107 COLUM. L. REV.
1533, 1560-62 (2007) (explaining that common law remedies were available against federal officials
for injuries committed during the Civil War, even while the writ of habeas corpus was suspended);
Amanda L. Tyler, Suspension as an Emergency Power, 118 YALE L.J. 600, 651-55 (2009) (noting that,
absent suspension of the writ of habeas corpus or legislation conferring immunity, federal officials
were subject to common law tort remedies for injuries committed during the Civil War, though
qualified immunity from suits was retroactively extended to federal officials through legislation
following the war).
94 See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
95 Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 807 (1982) (citation omitted) (quoting Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 506 (1978)).
96 Id. at 812; see also Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 520-24 (1985) (rejecting argument that
the Attorney General should enjoy absolute immunity from damages liability for his actions in
furtherance of national security functions, because, inter alia, the secrecy of national security
functions makes it “far more likely that actual abuses will go uncovered than that fancied abuses
will give rise to unfounded and burdensome litigation,” and because of the unavailability of
alternative checks on unconstitutional action, which are just as necessary “in matters of national
security as in other fields of governmental action”).
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in judicial lawmaking. Mere hesitation would not have produced rulings in
the defendants’ favor.
If a case does not fall within the established contours of any of these
other doctrines, the defendant could certainly ask the court to expand the
scope of one or more of these doctrines because of national security or state
secrets concerns. But not all of the cases that have followed the lower courts’
approach to the Bivens question summarized above have raised national
security or state secrets concerns.97 More importantly for present purposes,
the national security concerns would have to do much heavier lifting to
justify an expansion of these doctrines than to justify nonrecognition of a
Bivens action. The doctrine of qualified immunity and the state secrets
privilege are themselves regarded as judicially created federal common law
doctrines.98 If defendants were to ask a court to extend these doctrines, then
the courts’ reluctance to engage in judicial lawmaking would work against
them.
Indeed, scruples about judicial lawmaking should make courts even more
reluctant to expand an immunity or privilege than to recognize a new
federal right of action. After all, a primary objection to federal common
lawmaking is that it allows federal courts to displace state law too easily.99
Expansion of an immunity or privilege would effectively preempt existing
state law claims, whereas recognition of a new federal right of action would
merely supplement state law.100 A defendant seeking an expansion of an
existing federal common law immunity or privilege would be asking the
court to make law and hence to usurp the role of the legislature. For judges
disinclined to make new law, a mere reason to hesitate—the “remarkably
low” threshold applied by the lower courts in these recent cases—should
suffice to deny the defendant the requested extension of immunity or
privilege.

97 See, e.g., Benzman v. Whitman, 523 F.3d 119, 123 (2d Cir. 2008) (describing the plaintiff’s
Bivens claim, which centered on the allegation that the defendant knowingly caused the EPA to
release false statements about air quality at the World Trade Center disaster site).
98 See, e.g., Filarsky v. Delia, 132 S. Ct. 1657, 1660 (2012) (qualified immunity); United States
v. Abu-Jihaad, 630 F.3d 102, 140-41 (2d Cir. 2010) (state secrets), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 3062 (2011).
99 See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
100 To be sure, the recognition of a new remedy would displace the state’s decision to deny a
remedy in cases not satisfying the elements of existing state causes of action. Still, we think that
taking away an existing state remedy from state citizens injured by federal officials is more
offensive to state interests than granting a remedy as a matter of federal law where existing state
law would deny it, especially if the offending conduct is independently illegal as a matter of
federal law.
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II. CONSTITUTIONAL TORTS BEFORE BIVENS
Had Bivens never been decided and the Westfall Act never enacted,
someone in the shoes of Maher Arar, José Padilla, or the plaintiffs in Doe v.
Rumsfeld or Vance v. Rumsfeld would have been able to maintain his lawsuit
against the federal officials who violated his constitutional rights based on
state tort law. Though he may have had to initiate his action in the state
courts, the federal defendants would have been free to remove the case to
the federal district court upon the assertion of a federal defense.101
Federal officials have never been categorically exempt from damages
suits under the common law simply by virtue of their status as federal
officers. From the beginning of the nation’s history, federal (and state)
officials have been subject to common law suits as if they were private
individuals, just as English officials were at the time of the Founding.102
The fact that the defendant was a government official was relevant to the
official’s defense rather than the existence of a cause of action. If the claim
was based on the official’s conduct in performing his official duties, he could
plead justification as a defense, though this defense would fail if he had
exceeded his authority.103 In the United States, federal (as well as state)
officials were deemed to have exceeded their authority whenever they
violated the Constitution, on the theory that the government lacks the
power to authorize violations of the Constitution.104
Violation of the Constitution would thus result in the loss of any defense
of official justification, leaving the officer vulnerable to suit under the
common law as if he were a private individual. The rationale for denying
the official the immunity of the state and treating him as a private party was
well captured in a famous passage from Ex parte Young explaining why state

101 See 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(3) (2006); see also Mesa v. California, 489 U.S. 121, 139 (1989)
(holding that a federal officer can remove under § 1442(a) once he avers a federal defense).
102 See Louis L. Jaffe, Suits Against Governments and Officers: Sovereign Immunity, 77 HARV. L.
REV. 1, 1-2 (1963) (“From time immemorial many claims affecting the Crown could be pursued in
the regular courts if they did not take the form of a suit against the Crown. And when it was
necessary to sue the Crown eo nomine consent apparently was given as of course. Long before 1789
it was true that sovereign immunity was not a bar to relief.”).
103 See infra notes 104-06, 245-86 and accompanying text.
104 See Note, Developments in the Law: Remedies Against the United States and Its Officials, 70
HARV. L. REV. 827, 831-32 (1957) (explaining that damages suits against federal and state officers
who exceeded their authority were “for some time the most important method employed to obtain
monetary recovery”; the agents were relieved of liability only where “the action in question [was]
authorized by a constitutional act of Congress”); cf. Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Relations Between
State and Federal Law, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 489, 523-24 (1954) (describing the similar rationale for
suits requesting injunctive relief against state officials).
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officers are not protected by the Eleventh Amendment when their conduct
violates the Constitution:
The act to be enforced is alleged to be unconstitutional, and if it be so, the
use of the name of the State to enforce an unconstitutional act to the injury
of complainants is a proceeding without the authority of and one which
does not affect the State in its sovereign or governmental capacity. It is
simply an illegal act upon the part of a state official in attempting by the use
of the name of the State to enforce a legislative enactment which is void
because unconstitutional. If the act which the state Attorney General seeks
to enforce be a violation of the Federal Constitution, the officer in proceeding under such enactment comes into conflict with the superior authority of
that Constitution, and he is in that case stripped of his official or representative character and is subjected in his person to the consequences of his
individual conduct. The State has no power to impart to him any immunity
from responsibility to the supreme authority of the United States.105

Because the violation of the Constitution was deemed to strip the official of
his official or representative character, the law governing his liability was
the state law imposing liability on private individuals who caused analogous
injuries—not any special state law specifically applicable to government
officials.106
Had Maher Arar brought suit under this pre-Bivens regime, the injuries
that he suffered would have supported claims under a number of distinct
common law theories. Had he been detained and interrogated by private
individuals, his detention would clearly have given rise to a false imprisonment claim,107 and his coercive interrogation would likely have satisfied the
elements of assault, if not also battery.108 These claims would have been
most likely to prevail against the John Doe defendants who directly detained and interrogated him.109 These defendants would likely have defended
on the ground that they were just doing their jobs as federal officials,
perhaps pointing to instructions from higher-level officials. But this defense
would have failed if their own conduct—or, if their defense rested on
instructions from higher-level officials, the conduct of those officials—had
105
106

209 U.S. 123, 159-60 (1908).
See Developments in the Law, supra note 104, at 832 (“A government officer who acts without authority is . . . subject to the same legal rules as any private person.”).
107 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 35 (1965).
108 See id. § 21 (assault); id. § 13 (battery).
109 See Arar Complaint, supra note 39, paras. 22, 36-47 (alleging that Arar was “strip
searched,” “taken from his cell in chains and shackles,” told false information, and denied basic
constitutional rights).
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been shown to have violated the Constitution. Arar also sued the higherlevel officials who allegedly directed the tortious conduct.110 Had he brought
the suit under state tort law, his ability to maintain the claim against these
defendants may have turned on state law concerning agency or conspiracy.111
Again, the defense of justification would have failed if their actions had
been shown to have contravened the Constitution. Of course, Arar suffered
his most severe battery at the hands of the Syrian officials who tortured
him.112 Arar did not sue these foreign officials, but he did allege that they
were acting in concert with, or had colluded with, the federal officials he did
sue.113 Again, had he sued under state tort law, his success might have
depended, in the first instance, on whether he could have satisfied the
relevant state law requirements for proving liability under principles of
agency or conspiracy. Padilla’s state tort claims would have unfolded in a
similar manner, except that his claim of battery against the John Doe
defendants would not have depended upon state law of agency or conspiracy,
as those defendants were alleged to have physically abused him personally.114
Common law suits against federal officials did differ in one important
respect from suits against private individuals. Though federal officials have
never enjoyed the immunity of the federal government, they have enjoyed a
distinct immunity, now known as “official immunity.” The foregoing
analysis of Arar’s and Padilla’s likelihood of success under a state tort theory
is therefore subject to a very large qualification: they would not have
succeeded if the defendants had been protected by official immunity. But
exactly the same obstacle would stand in their way today had they been
afforded a Bivens claim, as official immunity applies whatever the source of
the cause of action.115
The scope of official immunity has varied both over time and according
to the sort of official involved.116 Certain types of officials—legislators,
110
111

Id. para. 68.
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01 (2006) (defining agency as a “fiduciary
relationship” in which “the agent shall act on the principal’s behalf and subject to the principal’s
control”). For a discussion of the common law “action on the statute,” see infra text accompanying
notes 136-43.
112 Arar Complaint, supra note 39, paras. 23-24, 49-52, 69.
113 Id. paras. 14-21, 68-70.
114 See Lebron v. Rumsfeld, 670 F.3d 540, 545 (4th Cir.) (“Padilla was removed from civilian
custody and transferred to the Naval Consolidated Brig at Charleston, South Carolina. While in
military custody, Padilla claims that he was repeatedly abused, threatened with torture, deprived
of basic necessities, and unjustifiably cut off from access to the outside world.”), cert. denied, 132 S.
Ct. 2751 (2012).
115 See infra note 126 and accompanying text.
116 In this Part, we provide a brief overview of the doctrine of official immunity. For a closer
look at the precise scope of official immunity at the time the Westfall Act was passed, with a focus
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judges, and prosecutors—have long enjoyed an absolute immunity from suit
for most of their acts.117 Executive officials were initially not entitled to any
immunity at all but were instead strictly liable for torts committed in excess
of their authority or otherwise contrary to law.118 Over time, the courts
came to recognize a common law immunity protecting such officials from
liability under certain circumstances. But unlike the immunity of legislators,
judges, and prosecutors, the immunity enjoyed by other executive officials
for injuries caused by conduct exceeding their authority has generally been a
qualified one.119
The scope of the immunity enjoyed by executive officials has a complex
history. For present purposes, two points are salient. First, while the scope
of immunity fluctuated over time and varied depending on the types of
conduct performed by the officer involved, the officers who enjoyed the
narrowest scope of immunity were those who inflicted physical injury to
persons or property,120 as some of the officials sued by Arar and Padilla are
alleged to have done. Officers who inflicted less tangible sorts of injuries
once enjoyed a broader immunity.121 Second, while there was much debate
in the cases and in the academic commentary about the proper scope of
liability of federal officials, this debate related to the scope of the immunity
on the immunity enjoyed by federal officials sued on a state tort theory for conduct violative of
the Constitution, see infra Part III.
117 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 1 (“[Senators and Representatives] shall in all Cases, except
Treason, Felony and Breach of the Peace, be privileged from Arrest during their Attendance at
the Session of their respective Houses, and in going to and returning from the same . . . .”);
Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 379 (1951) (recognizing immunity for state legislators “acting
in a field where legislators traditionally have power to act”); Randall v. Brigham, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.)
523, 535 (1868) (“[I]t is a general principle applicable to all judicial officers, that they are not liable
to a civil action for any judicial act done within their jurisdiction.”); see also Imbler v. Pachtman,
424 U.S. 409, 427 (1976) (holding that prosecutors have “the same absolute immunity under
§ 1983” that they “enjoy[] at common law”).
118 See Little v. Barreme, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170, 179 (1804) (finding an executive official
strictly liable because even instructions given by the Executive could not “legalize an act which
without those instructions would have been a plain trespass”); James E. Pfander & Jonathan L.
Hunt, Public Wrongs and Private Bills: Indemnification and Government Accountability in the Early
Republic, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1862, 1864 (2010) (contrasting the lack of immunity given to executive
officials under Little and Murray v. Schooner Charming Betty, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64 (1804), with
“modern official accountability rules,” which are more lenient).
119 See infra Section III.C.
120 See Ann Woolhandler, Patterns of Official Immunity and Accountability, 37 CASE W. RES. L.
REV. 396, 451 (1987) (“Direct invasions of person and tangible property are more traditionally
actionable.”).
121 See id. Today the “clearly established law” standard of qualified immunity applies to all
executive branch officials except those exercising prosecutorial functions and the President (acting
in any capacity). See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 809 (1982) (“Presidential aides, like
Members of the Cabinet, generally are entitled only to a qualified immunity.”).
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to which these officials were entitled, not to the existence of a cause of
action.122 That executive officials are subject to tort suits has always been
uncontroversial. Thus, although many scholarly articles in the pre-Bivens
era tackled the subject of official liability for tortious conduct, virtually all
of them focused on the scope of immunity;123 the existence of a cause of
action in tort was assumed.
By the middle of the twentieth century, the immunity of federal officials
generally protected them from liability if they were acting in good faith.124
The Supreme Court refashioned this immunity in Harlow v. Fitzgerald so
that it now protects officials unless they violate clearly established federal
law.125 The status of official immunity as federal or state law was unclear in
the pre-Erie period. Today, the immunity is understood to have the status
of federal common law, protecting federal officers whether sued under
Bivens or state common law.126 When precisely the immunity came to be
understood as federal common law is unclear, but it certainly was so understood before the Supreme Court’s decision in Bivens, as Justice Harlan
mentioned as a reason for recognizing a federal cause of action the fact that
the scope of liability would in any event be governed by federal law—

122 See Woolhander, supra note 120, at 451 (“Liability for harms to intangible economic interests,
or economic expectations, traditionally was of less concern, as reflected in use of sovereign immunity to
bar actions on government debt when no physical property invasions were alleged.” (emphasis added)
(footnote omitted)). As discussed below, the common law extended liability to wrongs producing
intangible injuries as early as the fifteenth century. See infra text accompanying note 134.
123 See, e.g., Edwin M. Borchard, Government Liability in Tort, 34 YALE L.J. 1 (1924); Jaffe,
supra note 102; Louis L. Jaffe, Suits Against Governments and Officers: Damage Actions, 77 HARV. L.
REV. 209 (1963); Developments in the Law, supra note 104.
124 See, e.g., Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 497-98 (1978) (“It is the existence of reasonable grounds for the belief formed at the time and in light of all the circumstances, coupled with
good-faith belief, that affords a basis for qualified immunity of executive officers for acts
performed in the course of official conduct.” (quoting Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 247-48
(1974))). Before Butz, some “policy-making” officials were thought to enjoy an absolute immunity
for discretionary conduct within the outer perimeter of their line of duty. See infra Section III.C.
Butz clarified that this immunity did not apply to conduct in violation of the Constitution and
held that, apart from prosecutors and other quasi-judicial officers, “qualified immunity from
damages liability [is] the general rule for executive officials charged with constitutional violations.”
438 U.S. at 508.
125 See 457 U.S. at 818 (“[G]overnment officials performing discretionary functions, generally
are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly
established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.”).
126 See, e.g., Expeditions Unlimited Aquatic Enters., Inc. v. Smithsonian Inst., 566 F.2d 289,
307 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (en banc) (Wilkey, J., concurring dubitante); see also, e.g., Cousins v. Lockyer,
568 F.3d 1063, 1072 (9th Cir. 2009). Some scholars and courts have suggested that federal officials
enjoy a broader immunity from state tort suits than from federal causes of action. We address this
claim in Section III.C, infra.
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apparently a reference to the doctrine of official immunity.127 Thus, if a
federal cause of action had not been recognized in Bivens, state law would
have provided the affirmative basis for the cause of action in suits such as
Arar’s and Padilla’s, and federal immunity law would have operated to
circumscribe the cause of action. As of 1982 (when Harlow was decided),
recovery would have been available only if the individual defendants had
violated clearly established federal law.
To modern eyes unfamiliar with the history of damages claims against
federal officials, the “common law cause of action/federal defense” model no
doubt seems odd. The federal interest in suits in federal court against
federal officials alleged to have violated the Federal Constitution would
appear to be strong, and that of the states comparatively weak. Moreover,
application of state law would appear to present a number of potential
problems. Federal courts today follow state court precedents when applying
the common law. The elements of a common law cause of action could well
vary from state to state, and thus a federal official would potentially be
subject to differing levels of liability for violation of the same constitutional
provision, depending on the state in which he was sued. Given divergent
state choice-of-law rules, a single official susceptible to suit in more than
one state might well face differing levels of liability depending on where the
plaintiff chose to bring suit.128 More importantly, whether the elements of a
state law tort action would advance the purposes of the constitutional
provision that the officer violated would appear to be, at best, fortuitous.
Finally, if the cause of action against state officials had its basis in state law,
state legislatures would apparently be free to repeal the remedy, leaving
persons injured by federal officials without recourse.
But, on closer inspection, these problems are less severe than they appear—and they were significantly less severe in the pre-Bivens era than they
are today. First, states are unlikely to want to do away with remedies for
their citizens against federal officers who injured them. More likely, states
would want to be overly generous—a problem addressed by the tandem of

127 See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388,
409 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring in the judgment) (“It seems to me entirely proper that these
injuries be compensable, according to uniform rules of federal law, especially in light of the very
large element of federal law which must in any event control the scope of official defenses to
liability.”).
128 Cf. Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 2074, 2086-87 (2011) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (objecting to the possibility that different rules might apply in different jurisdictions in national security
cases, and suggesting instead that, “[w]hen faced with inconsistent legal rules in different
jurisdictions, national officeholders should be given some deference for qualified immunity
purposes”).
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the federal officer removal statute and the federal common law of official
immunity. Moreover, the states are not completely unfettered by federal
law in revising their common law in its applicability to federal officials
alleged to have violated the Federal Constitution. The cases denying
government officers sovereign immunity suggest that officers who violate
the Constitution must be treated by the states like private parties who cause
analogous injuries.129 If so, the states would not be free to alter their
common law only for suits against federal officials; they would have to
revise their tort law generally.130 A similar conclusion would appear to
follow from the principle that the states may not discriminate against
federal law.131 As Professor Hill noted before Bivens, the nondiscrimination
principle would appear to require a state to make its tort remedies available
for injuries caused by violation of the Federal Constitution as long as it
supplies a remedy for injuries caused by violation of analogous standards of
care imposed by state law.132
It is true that the elements of common law torts will often not match up
well with the purposes underlying the constitutional provision that was
violated. For example, federal officials whose actions violated the Fourth
Amendment were usually sued in trespass, which traditionally required a
physical injury to person or property, whereas the Fourth Amendment also
protects less tangible interests. But, very often, if one common law cause of
action would be inadequate to protect the constitutional interests involved,
another cause of action will be available to fill that gap. Indeed, the common
law has long been characterized by its flexibility and its openness to evolving

129
130

See supra text accompanying notes 105-06.
Professor Amar has proposed that the states enact “converse-1983” statutes establishing a
statutory remedy for persons injured by action under color of federal law that violates the
Constitution. Akhil Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE L.J. 1425, 1428 & n.15
(1987); Akhil Reed Amar, Using State Law to Protect Federal Constitutional Rights: Some Questions and
Answers About Converse-1983, 64 U. COLO. L. REV. 159, 160 (1993); Akhil Reed Amar, Five Views
of Federalism: “Converse-1983” in Context, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1229 (1994). If the analysis in the text
is correct, the states may not be at liberty to establish special rules for the liability of federal
officials. (The nondiscrimination principle, see infra note 131 and accompanying text, may also
constrain the states in this regard.)
131 See Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386, 393 (1947) (“[T]he policy of the federal Act is the prevailing policy in every state. . . . [A] state court cannot refuse to enforce the right arising from the law
of the United States because of conceptions of impolicy or want of wisdom on the part of
Congress in having called into play its lawful powers.” (citation omitted) (internal quotation
marks omitted)); McKnett v. St. Louis & S.F. Ry., 292 U.S. 230, 234 (1934) (“A state may not
discriminate against rights arising under federal laws.”).
132 See Alfred Hill, Constitutional Remedies, 69 COLUM. L. REV. 1109, 1144-46 (1969) (“As long
as the state allows an action in negligence, its courts can hardly hold, as a matter of law, that a railroad was not negligent though in violation of a safety standard embodied in paramount federal law.”).
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to meet new needs.133 Thus, the inadequacies of the tort of trespass were
addressed in the fifteenth century through the evolution of the tort of
“trespass on the case,” which provided for liability even where “the wrong
complained of [did] not . . . consist of the direct application of unlawful
physical force to the body, lands, or goods of the plaintiff.”134 From the tort
of trespass on the case evolved such modern-day torts as defamation and
libel, negligence, and deceit.135
More relevantly, contemporaneously with the development of trespass
on the case, there developed from common law trespass the common law
“‘action on the statute’—a cause of action in tort resulting from activity in
violation of a legislatively created duty or standard.”136 As early as “the late
fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, actions labeled ‘trespass’ were being
brought upon statutes whether or not they provided in terms for special
penalties.”137 Although there was some retrenchment in the seventeenth and
eighteenth centuries, the reluctance during this period to permit tort actions
based on certain statutes extended only to statutes that themselves provided
for damages recovery by injured individuals, thereby suggesting that
Parliament intended to exclude other remedies.138 Decisions such as Ashby
v. White139 and Couch v. Steel140 demonstrate that the “common law right” to
recover for breach of a “duty . . . created by statute” was alive and well in
England during this period.141 In the United States, the common law

133 As discussed in Section III.A, the flexibility of the common law was one reason proffered
by the Solicitor General in his argument against creating a federal cause of action in Bivens. See
infra text accompanying note 185.
134 W.F. MAITLAND, EQUITY ALSO THE FORMS OF ACTION AT COMMON LAW: TWO
COURSES OF LECTURES 54 (A.H. Chaytor & W.J. Whittaker eds., 1910).
135 See id. at 360-61.
136 Al Katz, The Jurisprudence of Remedies: Constitutional Legality and the Law of Torts in Bell v.
Hood, 117 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 18 (1968); see also Hill, supra note 132, at 1134 (“[T]he common law did
not accommodate itself to paramount positive law only in allowance of a new right to overcome a
defense. Actions directly upon statutes were quite common.”).
137 Katz, supra note 136, at 20.
138 Id. at 28 (explaining that in cases where recovery was denied, the statutes involved “provided for a mode of recovery that would compensate the plaintiff in money”).
139 (1703) 92 Eng. Rep. 126 (K.B.) 136; 2 Ld. Raym. 938, 953-54 (Holt, C.J., dissenting)
(“Where a new Act of Parliament is made for the benefit of the subject, if a man be hindered from
the enjoyment of it, he shall have an action against such person who so obstructed him.”); see also
Katz, supra note 136, at 25 (“The Chief Justice’s dissenting opinion was accepted by the House of
Lords, which reversed the King’s Bench and entered judgment for the plaintiff.”).
140 (1854) 118 Eng. Rep. 1193 (K.B.) 1197; 3 El. & Bl. 402, 412-13.
141 Id.; see id. (“[T]he common law right to maintain an action in respect of a special damage
resulting from the breach of a public duty (whether such duty exists at common law or is created
by statute) is [not] taken away by reason of a penalty, recoverable by a common informer, being
annexed as a punishment for the non-performance of the public duty.”).
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“action on the statute” is reflected in decisions that are today sometimes
thought to have involved the implication of a cause of action under a
statute,142 as well as in the black letter tort of negligence per se.143
The common law tort of “action on the statute” and its modern-day
manifestations are, of course, of direct relevance to the question of state tort
remedies for violation of the Constitution. A state that recognizes this tort
may well permit recovery for violation of duties or standards set forth in the
Federal Constitution as well as those set forth in state law. Indeed, if a state
permits the recovery of damages for violation of standards imposed by the
state constitution, or perhaps even just by state statutes, its failure to permit
recovery on the basis of the Federal Constitution may run afoul of the
nondiscrimination principle mentioned above.144
Finally, disuniformity of remedies from state to state was not a significant problem throughout most of the pre-Bivens era because the pre-Bivens
era was, for the most part, also the pre-Erie era. At that time, the common
law was regarded as part of the “general” law.145 During the long reign of
Swift v. Tyson,146 federal courts did not follow state court precedents; they
interpreted and applied the common law according to their own best
judgment.147 Since 1948, all federal officials sued in state court have had the
142 See Tex. & Pac. Ry. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33, 39 (1916) (“A disregard of the command of
the statute is a wrongful act, and where it results in damage to one of the class for whose especial
benefit the statute was enacted, the right to recover the damages from the party in default is
implied, according to a doctrine of the common law . . . .” (emphasis added)).
143 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 286 (1965) (setting out the circumstances
under which a court may adopt the requirements of a legislative enactment or administrative
regulation as the standard of conduct of a reasonable man); PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW
OF TORTS § 36, at 220 (W. Page Keeton et al. eds, 5th ed. 1984) (“When a statute provides that
under certain circumstances particular acts shall or shall not be done, it may be interpreted as
fixing a standard for all members of the community, from which it is negligence to deviate.”). For
a contemporary Supreme Court decision involving negligence per se, see Merrell Dow Pharm.
Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804 (1986). In Merrell Dow, the plaintiffs claimed that the misbranding
of a drug in violation of federal law created a “rebuttable presumption of negligence.” Id. at 805-06.
144 See supra text accompanying notes 129-32.
145 See Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 71-73 (1938) (discussing how, in the past, “[t]he
federal courts assumed, in the broad field of ‘general law,’ the power to declare rules of decision
which Congress was confessedly without power to enact as statutes”).
146 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842), overruled by Erie, 304 U.S. 64.
147 See Erie, 304 U.S. at 71-73; TONY FREYER, HARMONY & DISSONANCE: THE SWIFT &
ERIE CASES IN AMERICAN FEDERALISM 39-40 (1981) (analyzing the discretion given to federal
judges under the Swift regime in deciding commercial cases); MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE
TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780–1860 (1977); HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ENTERPRISE AND AMERICAN LAW 1836–1937, at 83-84 (1991) (discussing the Swift Court’s failed attempt
to create uniformity in commercial law); Clark, supra note 69, at 1276 (suggesting that “federal
courts expanded the Swift doctrine to permit federal courts to disregard state judicial decisions on
an ever-expanding range of issues”); Ann Woolhandler, The Common Law Origins of Constitutionally
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statutory right to remove such suits to federal court on the basis of a federal
defense.148 Before 1948, many—though not all—federal officials enjoyed
such a right.149 In addition, suits against federal officials could often be
brought in federal court on the basis of diversity. As a result, the elements
of the common law torts for which the officials were sued would very often
be decided in the federal courts, subject to Supreme Court review.150
Moreover, because the common law was characterized by its flexibility, it
could be molded to the exigencies of constitutional litigation. As Ann
Woolhandler has demonstrated, federal courts adjudicating common law
tort actions against state and federal officials who were alleged to have
violated the Constitution during the pre-Erie period did not slavishly follow
state precedents regarding procedural or substantive issues, such as who the
appropriate parties were, or even what the elements of the relevant torts
were.151 Instead, they deviated from state law precedents on these issues
when they regarded such deviation to be necessary for the advancement of
the federal interests involved.152
Matters changed when the Supreme Court decided Erie Railroad v.
Tompkins in 1938.153 The Court disavowed the concept of “general law,” and
held that the common law was ordinarily state law.154 Federal courts were
thenceforth required to interpret and apply the common law as would the
courts of the state in which they sat. On the same day it decided Erie, the
Court recognized that certain matters of uniquely federal concern would be
governed by a federal common law.155 Federal common law differs from the

Compelled Remedies, 107 YALE L.J. 77, 87-88 (1997) (highlighting the Court’s willingness “to ignore
both state statutes and common law in areas that were ‘general’ rather than ‘local,’” partly in the
“belief that the application of state law might exceed the territorial limits of state power in such
cases”).
148 See Pub. L. No. 80-773, § 1442(a)(3), 62 Stat. 869, 938 (1948) (codified as amended at 28
U.S.C. § 1442(a)(3) (2006)).
149 See FALLON ET AL., supra note 68, at 746 (describing “myriad” federal rights and jurisdictional provisions that allowed for removal to federal courts before the right of removal was
extended to all federal officers in 1948).
150 See Woolhandler, supra note 147, at 89-90.
151 See id. at 110-11 (“[T]he federal courts in both law and equity showed considerable independence as to procedures and with respect to standing-to-sue and other elements of underlying
causes of action.”).
152 See id. at 162-63.
153 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
154 Id. at 78.
155 See Hinderlider v. La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92, 110 (1938)
(determining that the issue of interstate water rights “is a question of federal common law”).
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general law in that it displaces inconsistent state law. State courts accordingly
must follow federal precedent in interpreting and applying such law.156
After Erie, Courts addressing the question of damages for constitutional
violations could have framed the question as whether the previously
available “common law” remedies should now be understood to have the
status of federal common law. Because the availability of such remedies had
been determined by federal courts largely independently of state decisions,
and given the obvious federal interests involved, the federal courts’ pre-Erie
approach could easily and properly have been retained and recharacterized
in post-Erie terms as the application of a federal common law of remedies
for constitutional violations. Had this approach been taken, federal courts
could have pursued the development of such remedies with sensitivity to
the federal interests involved, including the need to give efficacy to the
Constitution, without being tied to state precedents, much as they had done
before Erie. Had the pre-Erie common law of remedies for federal officials’
violations of the Constitution been recharacterized as federal common law,
these remedies might well have been held to preempt the field, thus rendering the decision whether a federal cause of action existed in a particular
context, effectively, “Bivens or nothing.” But, if that approach had been
taken, the question of federal remedies for constitutional violations would
have been answered with a proper appreciation of the long tradition of
providing remedies according to a common law technique notable for its
flexibility in meeting constitutional needs. The recognition of a federal
remedy would not have been regarded as an act of judicial lawmaking so
much as the continuation of a longstanding and, indeed, constitutionally
contemplated remedial approach.157 The remedies would have been assumed
to be available, as they had been before Erie, without having to be judicially
created.
But that road was not taken. After Erie, the pre-existing common law
remedies were assumed to be state law remedies, and the question eventually
confronted by the Court was whether these state law claims should be
supplemented, or perhaps replaced, by a federal cause of action. That is how

156 See Local 174, Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95, 103-04 (1962) (holding that
rules of federal common law articulated by the federal courts necessarily displace state law even in
state courts); see also Henry J. Friendly, In Praise of Erie—And of the New Federal Common Law, 39
N.Y.U. L. REV. 383, 405, 421-22 (1964) (noting the vertical uniformity accomplished by post-Erie
federal common law).
157 The Solicitor General in Bivens argued that state tort remedies were the constitutionally
contemplated remedies for federal officials’ violations of the Constitution. See infra text accompanying notes 184-85.
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the issue was posed, soon after Erie, in Bell v. Hood.158 The plaintiff, asserting a claim under the Federal Constitution, had brought suit against a federal
official directly in federal court (rather than bringing suit in state court and
waiting for the suit to be removed).159 The lower court dismissed for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction, holding that the case did not arise under federal
law.160 (Although the plaintiff had at a minimum raised a federal response to
an anticipated defense, under the well-pleaded complaint rule, federal
jurisdiction is lacking when the federal issue is introduced only by way of
defense or replication.161) The Supreme Court found that the case arose
under federal law because the question whether federal law provided a cause
of action for violation of the Constitution was sufficiently substantial to
support federal question jurisdiction.162 But the Court did not resolve
whether federal law provided a cause of action for violation of the Constitution. Instead, the case was remanded to the district court,163 which held that
federal law did not provide a cause of action.164 The decision in Bell v. Hood
on remand was largely followed by the lower courts.165 There matters stood
when the courts were presented with the same question in Bivens.
III. BIVENS AND ITS AFTERMATH
Although the judges of the en banc Second Circuit disagreed vehemently
over the correct outcome in Arar v. Ashcroft, they (and their colleagues on
the Fourth, Seventh, and D.C. Circuits) agreed on one point: the plaintiff
either had a Bivens action or had no cause of action for damages at all.166 In
this respect, the courts of appeals’ recent approach to the Bivens question
was very different from the Supreme Court’s approach in Bivens itself:

158
159
160
161

327 U.S. 678 (1946).
Id. at 679.
Id. at 680.
See Louisville & Nashville R.R. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149, 153 (1908) (requiring the plaintiff to present a federal question in a “statement of its cause of action” and not by anticipating a
defense (citation omitted)).
162 Bell, 327 U.S. at 684-85.
163 Id.
164 Bell v. Hood, 71 F. Supp. 813, 820-21 (S.D. Cal. 1947).
165 See, e.g., United States v. Faneca, 332 F.2d 872, 875 (5th Cir. 1964); Johnston v. Earle, 245
F.2d 793, 796 (9th Cir. 1957) (“[T]he federal government has created no cause of action enforceable
in its courts for such torts under the state law, and hence the district court here lacked jurisdiction
of the subject matter.”); Koch v. Zuieback, 194 F. Supp. 651, 656 (S.D. Cal. 1961) (“[A]n action
for damages against a federal official whose acts constitute a denial of due process of law is not a
case arising under the Fifth Amendment and presents no federal question.”); Garfield v. Palmieri,
193 F. Supp. 582, 586 (E.D.N.Y.), aff ’d per curiam, 290 F.2d 821 (2d Cir. 1960).
166 See supra Section I.A.

2013]

State Law and the Bivens Question

543

Consistent with the pre-Bivens approach to constitutional remedies described
above, all of the Justices in Bivens, and all of the litigants, regarded the
Bivens question as a choice between recognizing a federal right of action for
damages directly under the Constitution or leaving the matter of damages
for violations of the Constitution by federal officials to the common law. It
was common ground in Bivens that, in the absence of a federal cause of
action, damages would be available on the basis of the common law.167 On
this understanding of the nature of the Bivens question, the “special factors”
that the Court said might “counsel[] hesitation” in recognizing a Bivens
action168 must be factors that favor leaving the question of damages to other
existing remedial regimes, including state law. Factors that would favor
leaving the plaintiff with no cause of action at all would bear instead on the
question of defenses, such as official immunity.
A. The Bivens Case
Webster Bivens was arrested on narcotics charges and had his home
searched by agents of the federal Bureau of Narcotics who lacked a warrant
for either the arrest or the search.169 In his complaint, Bivens alleged that
the agents had manacled him in front of his wife and children and threatened to arrest the whole family. Bivens was later taken to the station, where
he was subjected to a strip search.170 He sued the agents in federal district
court, alleging that they had caused him “great humiliation, embarrassment,
and mental suffering.”171 He sought $15,000 from each agent for the violation of his “constitutional rights.”172 Although his pro se complaint did not
refer specifically to the Fourth Amendment,173 it did allege that the search
was conducted without a warrant and, according to the Supreme Court,
“fairly read, it allege[d] as well that the arrest was made without probable
cause.”174 The district court dismissed the complaint, citing the lower

167
168

See supra notes 9-10, 75-79 and accompanying text.
Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 396

(1971).
169
170
171

Id. at 389.
Id.
Id. at 389-90. For more on Webster Bivens’s treatment, see also James E. Pfander, The
Story of Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, in FEDERAL
COURTS STORIES 275 (Vicki C. Jackson & Judith Resnik eds., 2010).
172 Id. at 280-81; see also Bivens, 403 U.S. at 398 (Harlan, J., concurring in the judgment).
173 Pfander, supra note 171, at 281.
174 Bivens, 403 U.S. at 389.
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court’s decision in Bell v. Hood on remand,175 and the Second Circuit
affirmed.176
To grasp how the Bivens question was understood by the Supreme
Court in Bivens, it is best to begin with the brief filed by President Nixon’s
Solicitor General, Erwin Griswold, who argued on behalf of the United
States against recognition of a federal damages remedy.177 Griswold presented the question to the Court as whether an “additional” damage remedy
should be recognized.178 He argued that a federal right of action for damages
for violation of the Fourth Amendment was inconsistent with original
intent.179 According to the Solicitor General, the Founders contemplated
that injuries suffered as a result of acts of federal officials that contravened
the Amendment would be compensated through common law actions such
as trespass.180 As explained in Part II, the breach of the Constitution
operated to defeat any defense of official justification, thereby leaving the
official open to common law remedies. The Solicitor General added that the
“plan envisaged when the Bill of Rights was passed” was that a person
injured by a breach of the Constitution “may proceed . . . by a suit at
common law . . . for damages for the illegal act.”181 Thus, the original intent
was not that a damages remedy would be unavailable until enacted by
Congress; to the contrary, the Founders contemplated that a damages
remedy would be available, namely, the remedy furnished by the common
law. Solicitor General Griswold regarded the common law remedy not
merely as the default damages remedy, but also as the constitutionally
contemplated one.
Griswold conceded that judicial recognition of a federal remedy would
be appropriate if such a remedy were “indispensable for vindicating constitutional rights.”182 It was on this ground, in his view, that federal law had
come to recognize the availability of injunctive relief for constitutional
violations by state and federal officials.183 But recognition of a federal
damages remedy was not necessary, he argued, because common law

175 Bivens v. 6 Unknown Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 276 F. Supp. 12, 15
(E.D.N.Y. 1967).
176 Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 409 F.2d 718, 726
(2d Cir. 1969).
177 Brief for the Respondents, Bivens, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) (No. 301), 1970 WL 116900.
178 Id. at 40.
179 Id. at 4-6.
180 Id.
181 Id. at 12 (citation omitted).
182 Id. at 24.
183 Id. at 17.
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remedies were available.184 The Solicitor General acknowledged that
common law remedies were sometimes inadequate, but he contended that
the federal remedy would suffer from the same deficiencies, and he noted
that the inadequacies could, in any event, be addressed within the common
law model, as “growth and improvement have always been the great tradition of the common law.”185 In short, the existence of common law remedies
was central to the government’s argument against recognizing a federal
cause of action directly under the Constitution in two important ways:
First, it was the damages remedy envisioned by the Framers. Second, the
existence of the state remedy made a federal remedy unnecessary.
The Court in Bivens similarly took for granted the existence of common
law damages remedies and understood the question before it as whether the
common law remedy should remain the exclusive one. It rejected the
government’s argument for such exclusivity as “unduly restrictive,” and it
recognized an “independent” federal claim affording damages to victims of
Fourth Amendment violations by federal officials, “regardless of whether
the State in whose jurisdiction [the federal] power is exercised would prohibit
or penalize the identical act if engaged in by a private citizen.”186 The
Court, and Justice Harlan in his concurrence, also rejected the government’s
argument that a federal remedy need be “indispensable” for vindicating the
Fourth Amendment.187 In Justice Harlan’s words, the question instead was
whether damages were “‘necessary’ or ‘appropriate’ to the vindication of the
interest asserted.”188
The conception of the Bivens question as whether existing common law
remedies should be supplemented with a federal one is perhaps most clearly
reflected in the opinions of the dissenting Justices, who would have declined
to recognize a federal cause of action on the ground that creating such
remedies is a legislative function. In their view, the majority was usurping
the power of Congress.189 This rationale is consistent only with a determination to leave preexisting common law remedies in place. After all, a
decision to displace state law and replace it with nothing is just as much an
act of judicial legislation as a decision to displace state law and replace it

184
185
186

Id. at 40.
Id.
Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 391-92,
395 (1971).
187 Id. at 392; see also id. at 406-07 (Harlan, J., concurring in the judgment).
188 Id. at 407 (Harlan, J., concurring in the judgment).
189 See supra notes 67-68.
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with something.190 In the absence of congressional action, federal courts
engage in judicial lawmaking when they decide to displace state law,
whether because of a need for uniformity or for another reason. Having
taken that step, the decision to replace a state law cause of action with a
federal cause of action is no more an act of lawmaking or a usurpation of the
role of the legislature than the decision to replace it with no cause of action
at all. Leaving victims of constitutional violations with neither a federal
cause of action nor their preexisting common law causes of action would be
as much a usurpation of legislative power as providing them with a substitute federal cause of action.
To be clear, we do not argue that a decision that a state law cause of action is displaced as a matter of federal common law would in no circumstances be justified.191 The point is merely that such a decision cannot rest
on a claimed lack of legislative power. A lack of legislative power can only
support a decision to leave the status quo in place, and, as discussed above,
that status quo at the time Bivens was decided was that federal officers who
violated the Constitution were subject to common law remedies. The
reluctance of the dissenting Justices in Bivens to engage in judicial lawmaking
is thus consistent only with the view that state law should continue to
govern. For those Justices, the supplementation or supplanting of such
actions was a decision for Congress, not the courts.
The Justices in the majority held a less restrictive view of the courts’
discretion to make law in the absence of congressional action.192 It is not

190 Henry Hart made this point forcefully (albeit in a different context) while noting that the
Supreme Court had overlooked the point in certain cases. See Hart, supra note 104, at 534 & n.179.
Hart wrote in 1954 that this “trend” (that is, the trend reflected in the cases overlooking our point
in the text) had “never been adequately thought through, and can be expected to pass.” Id. at 534.
Lamentably, his prediction has not proved entirely accurate. See, e.g., Tex. Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff
Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 643-47 (1981) (recognizing that the antitrust laws preempt state rules
of contribution but holding that federal courts lack the power to create a federal right of contribution for antitrust cases). But the Supreme Court’s occasional lapses do not undermine the validity
of Hart’s point, which we embrace here. But cf. Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 131 S. Ct.
2527, 2536 (2011) (noting that where federal law governs and “where, as here, borrowing the law of
a particular State would be inappropriate, the Court remains mindful that it does not have creative
power akin to that vested in Congress”).
191 As discussed in Part IV, infra, however, the Constitution itself may in certain circumstances require the availability of a damages remedy.
192 Their decision to recognize a cause of action not explicitly authorized by Congress would
not have been an act of lawmaking had they held that the Constitution implicitly required these
remedies. As previously discussed, the Solicitor General seemed to argue that the Constitution
required the availability of common law remedies as well as any additional remedies necessary for
vindicating the Constitution. The Bivens Court did not reject this view, but neither did it suggest
that the Constitution required the damages remedy the Court recognized insofar as it went
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entirely clear from the opinion whether these Justices understood the
federal remedy they were creating as preemptive of or supplemental to the
common law remedy. The majority never stated that it viewed the federal
remedy as exclusive. It did assert that the interests underlying trespass law
were sometimes hostile to those underlying the Fourth Amendment, but
the examples it gave of such hostility mainly involved situations in which
the common law underprotected Fourth Amendment interests.193 If underprotection was the problem, then the solution would be to supplement the
state cause of action with a federal cause of action, not to preempt the state
cause of action. Any concern that common law liability would unduly
restrict federal officials in the performance of their duties would have been
addressed by those officials’ “immun[ity] from liability by virtue of their
official position”194—an immunity that applies equally in common law and
Bivens actions.195
On the other hand, Justice Harlan’s concurrence mentioned the benefits
of uniformity and the undesirability of subjecting federal officials to “different rules of liability . . . dependent on the State where the injury occurs.”196
These considerations would support the conclusion that the Bivens action
preempts preexisting common law damage remedies. Still, uniformity is not
necessarily an overriding concern. The Federal Tort Claims Act, for
example, exposes the federal government to liability under the laws of
different states depending on where the injury occurred.197 Thus, following
the Bivens decision, one prominent contemporaneous scholar concluded that
“the existence of a federal substantive cause of action in no way forecloses
continued access to state tort remedies for those plaintiffs who would favor

beyond what was “indispensable for vindicating constitutional rights.” Bivens, 403 U.S. at 406
(Harlan, J., concurring in the judgment) (citation omitted).
193 See id. at 394-95 (majority opinion) (noting that trespass law is more lenient to individuals
asserting authority to enter as private citizens rather than as government agents). But cf. Corr.
Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 73 (2001) (noting that in Bivens the Court “found alternative
state tort remedies to be ‘inconsistent or even hostile’ to a remedy inferred from the Fourth
Amendment” (quoting Bivens, 403 U.S. at 394)).
194 Bivens, 403 U.S. at 397.
195 See id. at 409 (Harlan, J., concurring in judgment) (noting “the very large element of
federal law which must in any event control the scope of official defenses to liability,” and citing
pre-Bivens cases); see also infra Section III.C.
196 Bivens, 403 U.S. at 409 (Harlan, J., concurring in the judgment).
197 See 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1) (2006) (granting federal court jurisdiction over suits against
the United States for harms committed by its employees, “in accordance with the law of the place
where the act or omission occurred”).
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the state cause of action. . . . The federal remedy is independent, not
preemptive, of the state common law causes of action.”198
In any event, the important question for present purposes is not whether
common law remedies remain available in a particular context after a federal
cause of action has been recognized in that context, but rather whether
common law actions are preempted in contexts in which a federal cause of
action has not yet been recognized.199 In other words, does Bivens hold that
the liability of federal officials for damages is always exclusively a matter of
federal law? Nothing in Bivens supports such a reading. The Court was
careful to limit its holding to Fourth Amendment cases, and it expressed no
views about causes of action for violations of other constitutional provisions.200 Further, the focus of the Justices, especially the dissenters, on
whether the Court was usurping Congress’s power is consistent only with
the conclusion that they regarded the alternative to recognizing a Bivens
claim to be leaving the question of damages for constitutional violations by
federal officers as they found it. As discussed earlier, federal officers were
subject to common law actions under the status quo ante Bivens. Thus, after
Bivens, the question for courts considering whether to “extend Bivens to new
contexts” continued to be, as it was in Bivens itself, whether to recognize a
federal damages remedy or instead to retain the common law as the exclusive basis for the damages remedy. The special factors that might counsel
hesitation in recognizing a Bivens claim must therefore be factors that
militate in favor of leaving the question of damages to another existing
remedial regime, including state law, not factors that militate against any
right to damages at all.
B. After Bivens
The Supreme Court’s subsequent cases addressing whether Bivens
should be “extended to new contexts” are consistent with a conception of
the Bivens question as “Bivens or state law.” Few of the subsequent cases
dwell on the existence of common law damages remedies as an alternative to
a federal cause of action, but not because common law remedies were

198 Walter E. Dellinger, Of Rights and Remedies: The Constitution as a Sword, 85 HARV. L.
REV. 1532, 1540 (1972).
199 As noted above, the “Bivens question” that is the focus of this Article is the question
whether to extend Bivens to a new context. See supra notes 6 & 34.
200 See Bivens, 403 U.S. at 397 (“The question is merely whether petitioner, if he can demonstrate an injury consequent upon the violation by federal agents of his Fourth Amendment rights,
is entitled to redress his injury through a particular remedial mechanism normally available in the
federal courts.”).
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thought to be unavailable. As discussed below, the failure of those cases to
focus on common law remedies stems from the fact that alternative federal
remedies were available that were more appealing than those available
under state law. Yet even these cases include language confirming that, as a
general matter, common law remedies remained one alternative to a potential federal cause of action.
1. Initial Extensions of Bivens
Bivens was followed by two cases extending the federal cause of action to
federal officials’ violations of other constitutional provisions. In the first
such case, Davis v. Passman, the Court recognized a federal cause of action for
violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.201 The alleged
violation of the Due Process Clause consisted of gender discrimination in
staff hiring by a sitting Congressman.202 The alternative of suing under
state law was not given extensive consideration, but only because the
plaintiff conceded that she “ha[d] no cause of action under Louisiana
law.”203
In the second case, Carlson v. Green, the Court recognized a federal
cause of action against federal prison officials for violations of the Eighth
Amendment’s ban on cruel and unusual punishment.204 The plaintiff alleged
that the defendants’ failure to provide medical treatment to a prisoner who
subsequently died reflected “deliberate[] indifferen[ce] to the prisoner’s
welfare.”205 The district court had upheld a claim by the prisoner’s mother
under an Indiana wrongful death statute, but the statute placed severe limits
on the amount of recovery.206 In holding that a federal cause of action
existed, the Court did not question the availability of this state remedy. Its
analysis did not focus extensively on the alternative of recovery under state
law because a better alternative was available through the Federal Tort

201
202
203

442 U.S. 228, 248-49 (1979).
Id. at 231.
Id. at 245 n.23 (quoting Brief for Petitioner at 19). The Court went on to suggest that a
state cause of action might have been constitutionally unavailable, stating that “it is far from clear
that a state court would have authority to effect a damages remedy against a United States
Congressman for illegal actions in the course of his official conduct.” Id. (emphasis added) (citing
Tarble’s Case, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 397 (1872)). The Court’s doubts appear to have stemmed from
the unique fact that the defendant was a U.S. Congressman; the Court was not suggesting that
common law damages actions against federal officials were generally unavailable.
204 446 U.S. 14, 20 (1980).
205 Id. at 16 & n.1.
206 Id. at 17 n.4.

550

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

[Vol. 161: 509

Claims Act.207 The Court found even that alternative remedy to be inadequate for a variety of reasons, including the unavailability of punitive
damages under the FTCA.208 It was left to Justice Rehnquist, in dissent, to
confirm that the alternative to recognizing a federal right of action is
generally to leave the common law as the exclusive source of the damages
remedy. “It thus would seem,” he wrote, “that the most reasonable explanation for Congress’ failure explicitly to provide for damages in Bivens actions
is that Congress intended to leave this responsibility to state courts in the
application of their common law.”209
2. Subsequent Retrenchment
Following Carlson v. Green, a series of decisions declined to extend
Bivens to new contexts. These decisions, too, are—with one ambiguous
exception—consistent with the proposition that the alternative to recognizing
a Bivens claim is to leave the question of damages to the common law. In
most of these cases, as in both Davis and Carlson, the alternative of a
common law remedy did not receive prominent consideration. But, as in
Carlson, the failure to focus on state tort remedies stemmed from the fact
that Congress had established an alternative federal remedial scheme. For
example, in Chappell v. Wallace210 and United States v. Stanley,211 the Court
declined to recognize a Bivens action in the military context at least in part
because Congress had established “a comprehensive internal system of
justice to regulate military life.”212 Similarly, in Bush v. Lucas213 and
207 See id. at 20 (“In the absence of a contrary expression from Congress, § 2680(h) thus
contemplates that victims of the kind of intentional wrongdoing alleged in the complaint still have
an action under [the] FTCA against the United States as well as a Bivens action against the
individual officials alleged to have infringed their constitutional rights.” (emphasis added)).
208 See id. at 21-22 (discussing the inadequacy of an FTCA suit as a deterrent because of the
statutory prohibition on punitive damages, whereas, in a Bivens suit, “[p]unitive damages are ‘a
particular remedial mechanism normally available in the federal courts’” (quoting Bivens, 403 U.S.
at 397)). The Court was also concerned with a lack of uniformity under the FTCA, and noted that
the FTCA cause of action “exists only if the State in which the alleged misconduct occurred would
permit a cause of action for that misconduct to go forward,” whereas “it is obvious that the
liability of federal officials for violations of citizens’ constitutional rights should be governed by
uniform rules.” Id. at 23. This analysis would also render the Bivens action preferable to an action
under the common law.
209 Id. at 42 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). His reference to state courts overlooked the fact that
federal officers typically have a right to remove state law claims against them to federal court.
210 462 U.S. 296 (1983).
211 483 U.S. 669 (1986).
212 Id. at 679 (quoting Chappell, 462 U.S. at 302). These decisions—especially Stanley—are
sometimes invoked by the lower courts to support broader preclusion of Bivens remedies in
military and national security cases. See, e.g., Al-Zahrani v. Rodriguez, 669 F.3d 315, 319-20 (D.C.
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Schweiker v. Chilicky,214 the Court focused on the alternative remedial
scheme that Congress had created to address the sorts of injuries that the
plaintiffs had suffered.215 Where Congress has conferred remedies, the key
question is whether Congress has implicitly or explicitly precluded other
remedies.
Even so, the Court did note in some of these cases that common law
remedies are ordinarily available. For example, in Chappell, the Court
distinguished a nineteenth-century precedent, Wilkes v. Dinsman,216 on the
ground that it “involved a well-recognized common law cause of action by a
marine against his commanding officer for damages suffered as a result of
punishment,” and thus the plaintiff “did not ask the Court to imply a new
kind of cause of action.”217 And in Bush, the Court recognized that Bivens

Cir. 2012) (invoking Stanley as evidence that the Supreme Court has “preclude[d] Bivens claims
even . . . where damages are the sole remedy by which the rights of plaintiffs and their decedents
might be vindicated”). But a critical part of the reasoning in Stanley was that the plaintiff was
seeking to challenge his treatment while he was a servicemember. As the Court had already
established under the FTCA in Feres v. United States, there are special reasons to prevent
servicemembers from using the courts to vindicate claims against their (former) superior officers,
see 340 U.S. 135, 143-44 (1950)—reasons the Chappell and Stanley courts recognized as “special
factors,” 483 U.S. at 679; 462 U.S. at 298.
These “special factors” apply even to claims, like the FTCA claim in Feres, that are otherwise
provided for by statute (and they appear to apply in state court, as well). See supra notes 88-89 and
accompanying text. As Justice Scalia explained, the key in Stanley was that the “‘special factors
counseling hesitation,’—‘the unique disciplinary structure of the Military Establishment and
Congress’s activity in the field— . . . require abstention in the inferring of Bivens actions as
extensive as the exception to the FTCA established by Feres and United States v. Johnson.” Stanley,
483 U.S. at 683-84 (emphasis added) (citations omitted) (quoting Chappell, 462 U.S. at 304). In
other words, the basis for not inferring a Bivens remedy was a unique immunity doctrine
applicable to disputes between servicemembers and their superiors that the Court had already
established for all claims arising under state or federal law. See Vance v. Rumsfeld, 701 F.3d 193,
228 (7th Cir. 2012) (en banc) (Williams, J., dissenting) (“Stanley describes its principal point
unambiguously: Members of the military cannot invoke Bivens for injuries arising out of ‘activity
incident to service.’ Indeed, the Court reserved the possibility of Bivens suits by servicemen against
military officials in other contexts.” (quoting Stanley, 483 U.S. at 681)).
213 462 U.S. 367 (1983).
214 487 U.S. 412 (1988).
215 See id. at 429 (declining to extend a remedy for wrongful termination of benefits because
Congress had “addressed the problems”); Bush, 462 U.S. at 388 (“[The question] is whether an
elaborate remedial system that has been constructed step by step, with careful attention to
conflicting policy considerations, should be augmented by the creation of a new judicial remedy
for the constitutional violation at issue.”).
216 48 (7 How.) 89 (1849), after remand, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 390 (1851).
217 Chappell, 462 U.S. at 305 n.2. The Court also noted that “since the time of Wilkes, significant changes have been made establishing a comprehensive system of military justice,” id., thereby
suggesting that the common law remedy recognized in Wilkes may subsequently have been
preempted by congressional action.
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had “reject[ed] the argument that a state tort action in trespass provided the
only appropriate judicial remedy.”218
When the Bivens issue has arisen in a context in which Congress had not
affirmatively provided an alternative federal remedial scheme, the availability
of common law damage remedies has featured prominently in the Court’s
analysis. For example, in Correctional Services Corp. v. Malesko, the Court
declined to recognize a Bivens action against a private corporation operating
a halfway house under contract with the Federal Bureau of Prisons.219 It
relied heavily on the fact that prisoners injured by private corporations
“enjoy a parallel tort remedy that is unavailable to prisoners housed in
Government facilities.”220 And in Wilkie v. Robbins, the Court declined to
recognize a Bivens claim in part because the plaintiff “had a civil remedy in
damages for trespass” against the offending federal officials.221 The Wilkie
Court cited Malesko’s similar reliance on the existence of “state tort remedies in refusing to recognize a Bivens remedy.”222 More recently, in Minneci
v. Pollard, the Court relied on the availability of state tort remedies in
declining to recognize a Bivens action against employees of privately run
prisons.223
Some post-Carlson opinions include language or reasoning that is in tension with the Court’s understanding that the Bivens question poses a choice
between federal and state remedies. In Stanley, for example, Justice Brennan’s
dissenting opinion seemed to equate the absence of a Bivens remedy with
the existence of absolute immunity from liability.224 So understood, the
alternative to a Bivens remedy would indeed be no remedy at all, as an
official’s absolute immunity from suit would defeat both a Bivens remedy
and any common law action. If the Bivens question were understood as
“Bivens or state law,” the absence of a Bivens action would not amount to an
absolute immunity from liability in damages, as the official could still be
218
219
220

Id. at 375 (emphasis added).
534 U.S. 61, 72-73 (2001).
Id. The Court presumably meant that this parallel tort remedy was not available to prisoners housed in government facilities because the prison itself, or the government, is not suable.
The Court had earlier distinguished between suits against the United States or the Bureau of
Prisons and suits against the individuals who operate the prison. See id. at 72.
221 551 U.S. 537, 551 (2007).
222 Id.
223 132 S. Ct. 617, 624-26 (2012).
224 See 483 U.S. 669, 692 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“The
practical result of this decision is absolute immunity from liability for money damages for all
federal officials who intentionally violate the constitutional rights of those serving in the
military.”); id. at 691-92 (“As a practical matter, the immunity inquiry and the ‘special factors’
inquiry are the same; the policy considerations that inform them are identical, and a court can
examine these considerations only once.”).
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liable under the common law. Since Justice Brennan was the author of
Bivens, in which he clearly distinguished the existence of a Bivens action
from the presence of official immunity,225 he presumably did not mean to
suggest that the absence of a Bivens action always renders federal officials
absolutely immune from damages relief. Presumably, he meant instead that
the failure to recognize a Bivens action in the particular context of the
Stanley case would be tantamount to recognizing an absolute immunity for
the particular federal officials involved. Perhaps Justice Brennan’s analysis
here assumed the unavailability of common law remedies in the unique
context of suits by servicemembers for the reasons underlying the Court’s
earlier decision in Feres v. United States.226
More puzzling is the Supreme Court’s statement in FDIC v. Meyer that,
“by definition, federal law, not state law, provides the source of liability for
a claim alleging the deprivation of a federal constitutional right.”227 On the
surface, this statement appears to deny the possibility that the common law
could be a “source of liability” for injuries caused by federal officials through
conduct that violates the plaintiff’s federal constitutional rights. As we have
seen, however, common law actions such as trespass were traditionally the
“source of liability” for federal officials alleged to have violated the Constitution.228 Because the statement, if read literally, is so clearly incorrect, an
alternative reading should be preferred, if available.
The Court’s statement in Meyer comes in a part of the opinion holding
that the FDIC’s entitlement to immunity had been waived by its organic
statute.229 The proposition in question was central to the Court’s analysis of
the relationship between the FDIC’s organic statute and several provisions
of the FTCA. Section 2679(a) of the FTCA provides that agencies are not
suable under their organic statutes for “claims which are cognizable under
section 1346(b)” of the FTCA.230 Section 1346(b), in turn, confers jurisdiction on the federal courts over damages claims against the United States for
injuries caused by federal employees within the scope of their employment
“under circumstances where the United States, if a private person, would be

225 In Bivens, the Court held that a federal cause of action existed, yet it remanded for consideration of whether the defendants were entitled to immunity. Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents
of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 397-98 (1971).
226 See Stanley, 483 U.S. at 679; see also id. at 683-84 (citing Feres v. United States, 340 U.S.
135, 146 (1950)).
227 510 U.S. 471, 478 (1994).
228 See supra Part II.
229 See Meyer, 510 U.S. at 475 (“By permitting the [FDIC] to sue and be sued, Congress
effected a ‘broad’ waiver of the [FDIC’s] immunity from suit.”).
230 28 U.S.C. § 2679(a) (2006).
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liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the act
or omission occurred.”231 The Court concluded that Meyer’s claim was not
cognizable under § 1346(b), and that the waiver of immunity in its organic
statute was consequently applicable, because the source of the liability in
Meyer’s case was federal, not state, law.232 Hence, the United States, if a
private person, would not be liable under the law of the state where the act
or omission occurred.
If the Court were understood to be saying that state law “by definition”
cannot provide the source of liability for claims alleging constitutional
deprivations, the statement would be contradicted by the long history of
state tort remedies against state and federal officials whose conduct was
deemed to be unauthorized because it violated the Constitution. The Court
should instead be understood to have stated that a complaint asserting a
federal cause of action for violation of the Constitution “by definition” does
not set forth a state law claim. In other words, the Court should be understood to have said that a claim is not cognizable under § 1346(b) where the
claimant has framed his claim as a federal constitutional claim. The point
seems tautological, but the opinion’s language indicates that the Court was
only making a definitional point. On this reading, if a claimant framed his
claim as one of trespass, assault, or false imprisonment, the claim would fall
within § 1346(b), and the agency would therefore be immune except to the
extent authorized by the FTCA, even if the employee’s conduct also violated
the Constitution.233
The alternative would be to read this statement as reflecting the Court’s
view that, sometime after Bivens, state law remedies against federal officials
had come to be preempted as a matter of federal common law. But such a
reading is untenable for three reasons. First, the Court did not purport to
be making a point about the current state of the law; rather, it purported to
be making a point about the logic of constitutional claims.234 Second, as
noted, in Malesko and Wilkie, both decided after Meyer, the Court recognized the possibility of common law tort claims for injuries resulting from
acts by federal agents or officials that violated constitutional rights. Indeed,
in Westfall v. Erwin, the Court clearly upheld the availability of state tort
231
232
233

Id. § 1346(b)(1).
Meyer, 510 U.S. at 477-78.
As discussed in the next Part, the Westfall Act would immunize the officer as well from
liability on a common law tort theory, but as we also explain in Part IV, it is not clear that the Act
was intended to immunize the officer when the plaintiff alleges a violation of the Constitution.
234 This conclusion follows from the Court’s declaration that “[b] y definition, federal law, not
state law, provides the source of liability for a claim alleging the deprivation of a federal constitutional right.” Meyer, 510 U.S. at 478 (emphasis added).
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remedies against federal officials.235 Although the focus of the Court’s
discussion in Westfall was the scope of the officials’ immunity, the opinion
left no doubt that state law causes of action were available. The Westfall case
did not involve allegations of a constitutional violation, but there is little
reason or support for barring state tort remedies when the federal official
has violated a state duty of care and the Federal Constitution, but not when
the official has violated a state duty of care but not the Federal Constitution.
If a distinction were to be drawn according to whether the Constitution was
violated, one would expect the presence of allegations of a constitutional
violation to have cut the other way (as indeed Congress provided when it
addressed the issue in the Westfall Act236).
Finally, such a broad preemption of state tort remedies would have constituted a massive exercise of legislative power, something that Justices
disinclined to “extend” Bivens regard as the function of Congress, not of the
courts. If the Court had meant to assert that this radical change had come
about through federal common lawmaking sometime after the Bivens
decision, one would have expected from the Justices in the majority in
Meyer at least some analysis of this issue and a hint of criticism of such
judicial activism.237 Moreover, if federal common law had somehow come to
preempt the field of remedies against federal officials for constitutional
violations, then an aversion to judicial lawmaking could no longer ground
an unwillingness to recognize a federal cause of action: as already discussed,
once the courts have held state law to be preempted as a matter of federal
common law, a decision to replace state law with nothing is no less an act of
judicial legislation than a decision to replace it with something. Yet the

235 See 484 U.S. 292, 296 (1988) (refusing to adopt the position that federal employees are
immune from damage suits under state tort law), superseded by statute, Westfall Act, Pub. L. No.
100-694, § 5, 102 Stat. 4563, 4564 (1988) (amending 28 U.S.C. § 2679(b)); see also Westfall Act
§ 2(a)(4) (“Recent judicial decisions, and particularly the decision of the United States Supreme
Court in Westfall v. Erwin, have seriously eroded the common law tort immunity previously
available to Federal employees.”); Westfall Act § 2(a)(5) (“This erosion of immunity of Federal
employees from common law tort liability has created an immediate crisis involving the prospect
of personal liability and the threat of protracted personal tort litigation for the entire Federal
workforce.”).
236 See Westfall Act § 5 (excepting from its grant of immunity those actions that violate the
Federal Constitution) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2679(b)(2)(A)); see also supra note 235.
237 Another alternative would be to read the Court’s statement in Meyer as reflecting the
Court’s interpretation of the Westfall Act as preempting all state tort claims against federal
officials. This reading is equally untenable. The Court in Meyer did not even cite the Westfall Act.
Moreover, as noted in the text, the Court purported to be making a point about the logic of
constitutional actions, not a point about the current state of the law.
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Justices in the Meyer majority continue to assert that recognition of a Bivens
claim would usurp the power of Congress.238
In summary, the Court’s more recent cases determining whether to extend Bivens to new contexts do not deviate from its initial conceptualization
of the Bivens question as “Bivens or (only) state law.” Several decisions rely
on the existence of state law remedies as a reason for declining to extend
Bivens. Stray language in some opinions suggests, at most, that some Justices
(and, on one occasion, the Court as a whole) have at times overlooked the
fact that state tort remedies would generally remain available for federal
officials’ violation of the Constitution even if a Bivens action were not
recognized. To read these statements as reflecting a never-explained and
never-justified federal common law preemption of the field of remedies
against federal officials for violation of the Constitution would be an
unwarranted interpretation of ambiguous language.
Preemption of state tort remedies through congressional action would not
be vulnerable to this particular criticism, and the Supreme Court in Pollard
appears to have read the Westfall Act to have done just that.239 As we show
in Part IV, however, if the Westfall Act preempts state tort remedies for
federal officials’ violations of constitutional rights, then it also rules out the
courts of appeals’ “hesitant” approach to the recognition of Bivens claims.
C. Federal Officials’ Immunity from Liability
for their Unconstitutional Acts
The foregoing analysis shows that, at least in theory, state law causes of
action remained available at the time Congress passed the Westfall Act in
1988. But there remains the possibility that such remedies may have been
effectively unavailable as a result of the operation of official immunity
doctrines. Thus, before turning to the Westfall Act, we examine the scope
of federal officials’ immunity from common law tort claims as it stood in
1988, when the Westfall Act was passed. Although scholars have claimed
that, by 1988, federal officials had come to enjoy absolute immunity from

238 See, e.g., Malesko v. Corr. Servs. Corp., 534 U.S. 61, 68-69 (2001) (noting appropriateness of deference to Congress); id. at 75 (Scalia, J., concurring) (decrying the Court’s previous
creation of causes of action “‘implied’ by the mere existence of a statutory or constitutional
prohibition . . . since an ‘implication’ imagined in the Constitution can presumably not even be
repudiated by Congress”).
239 See Minneci v. Pollard, 132 S. Ct. 617, 623 (2012) (“Prisoners ordinarily cannot bring
state-law tort actions against employees of the Federal Government.”).
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common law actions,240 the cases actually confirm that such officials enjoyed, at most, a qualified immunity from common law actions seeking
compensation for injuries resulting from their unconstitutional conduct.
As discussed in Part II, today most federal officials enjoy a qualified
immunity from Bivens actions: they are immune if they did not violate
clearly established federal law. This standard was articulated by the Court
in Harlow v. Fitzgerald, decided in 1982.241 Before Harlow, federal officials
enjoyed immunity for conduct undertaken in good faith.242 Bivens itself
suggests that federal law enforcement officials sued on a common law tort
theory for constitutional violations enjoyed no more than a qualified
immunity: In explaining his agreement with the majority’s recognition of a
federal right of action, Justice Harlan noted that federal law would in any
event govern federal officials’ defenses to liability243—an apparent reference
to those officials’ immunity. Since Justice Harlan was making a point about
the necessary role of federal law in suits against such officers in the event a
federal right of action were not recognized, he must have meant that federal
officers enjoyed such immunity from state law tort suits. He also must have
understood the immunity to be a qualified one. If he and the other Justices
in Bivens had believed that federal officers enjoyed an absolute immunity
from state law tort suits—the only sort of suit recognized at the time—they
would not have regarded the choice before them—as all of them, and the
litigants, did—as “Bivens or (only) state law.”244
Although the pre-Bivens cases were not uniform, most are consistent
with the view that qualified immunity was the rule and absolute immunity
the exception, at least for federal officials of the sort involved in Bivens. As
noted, the Court has long recognized that judges and prosecutors enjoy an
absolute immunity.245 In Barr v. Matteo, the Court extended this absolute
immunity to an additional (though uncertain) range of executive officials.246
Specifically, the Barr Court held that the head of an administrative agency
enjoyed an absolute privilege from suit for defamation or libel for conduct
240 See, e.g., FALLON ET AL., supra note 68, at 1006-07 (“Prior to 1988, when a state law tort
action was brought against a federal officer, federal common law had established a shield of
absolute immunity from damages liability . . . .”).
241 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).
242 See supra note 124.
243 Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 409
(1971) (Harlan, J., concurring in the judgment).
244 See also Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 505 (1978) (“Our opinion in Bivens put aside
the immunity question; but we could not have contemplated that immunity would be absolute.”).
245 See David E. Engdahl, Immunity and Accountability for Positive Governmental Wrongs, 44 U.
COLO. L. REV. 1, 43-47 (1972).
246 360 U.S. 564, 574-76 (1959) (plurality opinion).
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taken “within the outer perimeter of [his] line of duty,” notwithstanding
allegations in the complaint of malice.247 The Court declined to limit the
privilege to cabinet officials, but it acknowledged that the immunity enjoyed
by the head of an agency was “far broader than in the case of an officer with
less sweeping functions.”248 With respect to the case before it, the Court
held that the official was immune from liability because his conduct “was an
appropriate exercise of the discretion which an officer of that rank must
possess if the public service is to function effectively.”249
The lower courts had considerable difficulty applying the Barr standard.
Many distinguished between “discretionary” and “ministerial” functions,
but one prominent contemporaneous commentator noted that such a
dichotomy is “at the least unclear, and one may suspect that it is a way of
stating rather than arriving at the result.”250 Nevertheless, and consistent
with Barr’s recognition that officials exercising “less sweeping functions”
enjoyed a narrower privilege, most of the lower courts found Barr’s absolute
privilege inapplicable to police and similar rank-and-file law enforcement
officers. In Bivens itself, the Court did not reach the immunity question,
although Justice Harlan, the author of the plurality opinion in Barr, expressed his belief that immunity would be inapplicable “with respect, at
least, to the most flagrant abuses of official power.”251
On remand from the Supreme Court, the Second Circuit in Bivens held
that the defendants were not entitled to the broad immunity recognized in
Barr,252 and concluded instead that they were entitled to a qualified privilege protecting them from liability for actions taken in good faith.253 In so
holding, the court relied on prior decisions involving common law suits
against federal officials and suits against state officials under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983, without suggesting that the scope of immunity varied depending on

247
248
249

Id. at 575.
Id. at 573.
Id. at 575; see also id. (“It would be an unduly restrictive view of the scope of the duties of
a policy-making executive official to hold that a public statement of agency policy in respect to
matters of wide public interest and concern is not action in the line of duty.”).
250 Jaffe, supra note 123, at 218. Jaffe’s thesis was that the immunity cases reflected an implicit
“balancing of certain important factors,” namely, “the character and severity of the plaintiff’s
injury, the existence of alternative remedies, the capacity of a court or jury to evaluate the
propriety of the officer’s action, and the effect of liability whether of the officer or of the treasury
on effective administration of the law.” Id. at 219.
251 Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 410
(1971) (Harlan, J., concurring in the judgment).
252 Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 456 F.2d 1339,
1345-47 (2d Cir. 1972).
253 Id. at 1347-48.
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the source of the remedy being sought.254 Admittedly, the case law addressing which other types of federal officials were entitled to absolute immunity
and which were entitled to qualified immunity, and for which sorts of
claims, was in a highly unsettled state until the Court held in Butz v.
Economou that, with very limited exceptions, executive officials sued for
their unconstitutional conduct enjoyed only a qualified immunity.255 A few
years after Butz, the Court brought additional certainty to this area of the
law by holding in Harlow that qualified immunity protects federal officials
only if their conduct was consistent with clearly established federal law.
That is where the law of official immunity stood when Congress enacted the
Westfall Act in 1988.
Nevertheless, the current edition of the Hart and Wechsler casebook, citing Barr, asserts that, “[p]rior to 1988, when a state law tort action was
brought against a federal officer, federal common law had established a
shield of absolute immunity from damages liability for actions within the
‘outer perimeter of [the official’s] line of duty.’”256 If the claim is that
federal officials came to enjoy an absolute immunity from common law tort
claims upon the Court’s decision in Barr in 1959, or soon thereafter, that
position is contradicted by the authorities discussed above.257 Although a
range of federal officials of uncertain scope enjoyed an absolute immunity,
the immunity did not by any means apply to all—as Barr itself made clear.
254 See id. at 1346 (“[T]he common law has never granted police officers an absolute and
unqualified immunity . . . .” (quoting Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 555 (1967))); id. at 1347 (“[A]
Federal officer . . . sued in tort at common law, should [not] be held to enjoy an immunity denied
his state or territorial brother similarly situated.” (quoting Carter v. Carlson, 447 F.2d 358, 371
(D.C. Cir. 1971) (Nichols, J., concurring), rev’d on other grounds, 409 U.S. 418 (1973))); see also
Bethea v. Reid, 445 F.2d 1163, 1165 (3d Cir. 1971) (emphasizing that Bivens reserved the applicable
immunity for “enforcement agents”); Anderson v. Nosser, 438 F.2d 183, 194-95 (5th Cir. 1971)
(reiterating the distinction between the absolute immunity of some officers and the qualified
immunity of others); Kelley v. Dunne, 344 F.2d 129, 133 (1st Cir. 1965) (postal inspector not
entitled to Barr immunity); Hughes v. Johnson, 305 F.2d 67, 70 (9th Cir. 1962) (holding federal
game wardens not entitled to immunity from a trespass action alleging unconstitutional search,
and distinguishing Barr as not involving allegations of constitutional violations); Developments in
the Law, supra note 104, at 835 (“[L]ower ranking officers are severely restricted in the amount of
judgment they are permitted to exercise without risking liability.” (citing cases)). But cf. Norton v.
McShane, 332 F.2d 855, 859-60 & nn.5-6 (5th Cir. 1964) (relying on pre-Barr cases for the
proposition that some federal law enforcement officers are entitled to absolute immunity even
under Barr’s framework).
255 438 U.S. 478, 507 (1978).
256 FALLON ET AL., supra note 68, at 1006-07 (quoting Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564, 575
(1959) (plurality opinion)).
257 See also PAUL M. BATOR ET AL., HART & WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND
THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 1421 (2d ed. 1973) (“Did not the Supreme Court decision in Bivens imply,
notwithstanding reservation of the question, that federal officials perpetrating an unconstitutional
search or seizure were not totally immune to liability for damages?”).
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If the claim is instead that, sometime between the Bivens decision and the
enactment of the Westfall Act, federal officials came to enjoy an absolute
immunity from state tort claims, albeit not from the federal Bivens action, it
is contradicted by the Supreme Court decisions discussed below.
The claim that by 1988 federal officials had come to enjoy an absolute
immunity from state tort claims clearly conflicts with at least one Supreme
Court decision (and a unanimous one at that)—Westfall v. Erwin, in which
the Court held that officials who do not exercise discretionary functions do
not enjoy any such immunity.258 But Westfall is the decision that precipitated
the enactment of the Westfall Act, the purpose of which, according to
Congress, was to restore the law of immunity to where it stood before the
Court’s decision, which Congress regarded as erroneous.259 Of course, the
Court in Westfall may have correctly applied existing law, and Congress
may have been mistaken about the state of the prior law. Nevertheless,
given that Congress’s intent was to restore what it regarded as the law that
predated what it regarded as an erroneous Supreme Court decision, in
interpreting the Westfall Act we must assume that the Court’s holding in
Westfall was mistaken.
But what was the error in Westfall that Congress intended to correct?
For present purposes, the important aspect of Westfall is one it shares with
Barr v. Matteo260: neither case involved conduct by a federal official in
violation of the Constitution. We argue in Part IV that the Westfall Act is
best understood to have preempted state tort actions against federal officials
who did not violate the Constitution. Here, we show that the Supreme
Court had clearly held, in the years immediately preceding the Westfall
Act, that only federal officials who were not alleged to have violated the
Constitution enjoyed an absolute immunity from state tort suits. With the
exception of prosecutors and other quasi-judicial officials,261 federal officials
enjoyed only a qualified immunity from liability for their unconstitutional
conduct. Thus, to the extent that the Westfall Act was intended to restore
the pre-Westfall law, it must have been intended to confirm the unavailability
258 See 484 U.S. 292, 297-98 (1988) (“[A]bsolute immunity from state-law tort actions should
be available only when the conduct of federal officials is within the scope of their official duties
and the conduct is discretionary in nature.”), superseded by statute, Westfall Act, Pub. L. No. 100694, § 5, 102 Stat. 4563, 4564 (1988) (amending 28 U.S.C. § 2679(b)).
259 See H.R. REP. NO. 100-700, at 4 (1988) (“The functional effect of H.R. 4612 is to return
Federal employees to the status they held prior to the Westfall decision.”).
260 360 U.S. 564. This case contains the “outer perimeter” language quoted by FALLON ET
AL., supra note 68, at 1006-07. See 360 U.S. at 575 (plurality opinion); see also supra note 256 and
accompanying text.
261 As discussed above, certain categories of officials, such as judges and prosecutors, enjoyed
an absolute immunity from certain types of claims. See supra notes 111-18 and accompanying text.

2013]

State Law and the Bivens Question

561

of state tort remedies in cases not alleging a violation of the Constitution—
the sorts of cases exemplified by Westfall and Barr v. Matteo.262
The most thorough post-Bivens, pre–Westfall Act discussion of the
scope of the immunity enjoyed by federal executive officials from liability
for their constitutional violations—and the last word on the subject before
the enactment of the Westfall Act (apart from the Westfall decision itself)—
is found in Butz v. Economou.263 The plaintiff in Butz had sued a number of
officials of the Department of Agriculture, raising Bivens claims as well as
common law tort claims such as abuse of process, malicious prosecution,
invasion of privacy, negligence, and trespass.264 The district court had
dismissed the claims, citing the “outer perimeter” language from Barr.265
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the officials were entitled only
to qualified immunity.266 Although Butz is sometimes read to have held that
federal officials are entitled to qualified immunity from Bivens claims but
absolute immunity from state law claims,267 the opinion actually establishes
that qualified—not absolute—immunity applies to state law claims in which
the defendant is alleged to have violated the Constitution, regardless of the
legal basis of the remedy being sought.
The Court in Butz began by distinguishing Barr v. Matteo, on which the
district court and the defendant had principally relied.268 Barr, the Court
noted, did not involve a claimed violation of the Constitution. Instead, the
issue in Barr was whether the defendant official could be held liable for
conduct “otherwise within the official’s authority” if he had acted with
malice.269 The Court in Barr rejected such liability.270 But, the Butz Court
stressed, “quite a different question would have been presented [in Barr]
262 See also 28 U.S.C. § 2679(b)(2)(A) (2006) (exempting actions “brought for a violation of
the Constitution” from the application of the provision otherwise rendering the FTCA the
exclusive remedy (and thereby preempting state law) for the torts of federal officials); Hui v.
Castaneda, 130 S. Ct. 1845, 1851 (2010) (“The Westfall Act amended the FTCA to make its
remedy against the United States the exclusive remedy for most claims . . . Notably, Congress also
provided an exception for constitutional violations.” (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2679(b)(2)(A))).
263 438 U.S. 478 (1978).
264 Id. at 482-83, 483 n.5.
265 See id. at 483-84 (“The District Court . . . held that the individual defendants would be
entitled to immunity if they could show that ‘their alleged unconstitutional acts were within the
outer perimeter of their authority and discretionary.’” (citation omitted)).
266 Id. at 507.
267 See, e.g., Martin v. D.C. Metro. Police Dep’t, 812 F.2d 1425, 1428 n.11 (D.C. Cir. 1987)
(noting that there was a “distinction indicated (but not explained) in Butz between a federal
official’s absolute immunity from common law claims and qualified immunity from constitutional
claims”).
268 Butz, 438 U.S. at 487.
269 Id. at 488.
270 Id.
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had the officer ignored an express . . . constitutional limitation on his
authority.”271 To recognize absolute immunity in the latter situation would,
according to the Court, contradict Supreme Court decisions stretching back
to the beginning of the Republic.272 Notwithstanding the immunity that
federal officials otherwise enjoyed, the Court, in well-known cases such as
Little v. Barreme,273 had recognized that “[a] federal official who acted
outside of his federal statutory authority would be held strictly liable for his
trespassory acts.”274 Although Little v. Barreme involved conduct exceeding
the scope of authority as set forth in statutes, the Court noted in Butz that
the principle applied equally to conduct that was outside the official’s
authority because it violated the Constitution.275 “Since an unconstitutional
act, even if authorized by statute, was viewed as not authorized in contemplation of law, there could be no immunity defense.”276
Barr and Spalding v. Vilas,277 upon which Barr had relied,278 were entirely
consistent with this older line of cases. Indeed, “[i]f any inference is to be
drawn from Spalding . . . it is that the official would not be excused from
liability if he failed to observe obvious statutory or constitutional limitations on his powers or if his conduct was a manifestly erroneous application
of the statute.”279 Although Barr extended the immunity somewhat beyond
Spalding, the important point for the Court in Butz was that “[t]he liability
of officials who have exceeded constitutional limits was not confronted in
either Barr or Spalding.”280 Thus, neither case supports absolute immunity
in such circumstances.
In distinguishing Barr and Spalding throughout the opinion, the language used by the Court in Butz encompassed not just Bivens claims, but
any claim based on unconstitutional conduct. Thus, the Court wrote that
“Barr did not purport to protect an official who has not only committed a
wrong under local law, but also violated those fundamental principles of

271
272

Id. at 489.
See id. (“Barr did not, therefore, purport to depart from the general rule, which long
prevailed, that a federal official may not with impunity ignore the limitations which the controlling law has placed on his power.”).
273 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170 (1804).
274 Butz, 438 U.S. at 489-90.
275 Id. at 490.
276 Id. at 490-91.
277 161 U.S. 483 (1896).
278 See Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564, 570-72 (1959) (plurality opinion).
279 Butz, 438 U.S. at 494.
280 Id. at 495.
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fairness embodied in the Constitution.”281 The Court furthermore explained
that
neither [Barr nor Spalding] purported to abolish the liability of federal officers for actions manifestly beyond their line of duty; and if they are accountable when they stray beyond the plain limits of their statutory authority, it
would be incongruous to hold that they may nevertheless willfully or knowingly violate constitutional rights without fear of liability.282

Each time the Court described the type of case to which absolute immunity
did not extend, it referred to the type of conduct in which the defendant
engaged—specifically, whether the conduct exceeded authority, including
by violating the Constitution—not whether the cause of action asserted was
based on federal or state law.283 In the Court’s view, suits based on unconstitutional conduct were just a subset of a larger set of cases not subject to
absolute immunity, namely, suits in which the officer exceeded the scope of
his authority.284 The Court thus cannot be taken to have limited its holding
to Bivens claims, as suits based on conduct that exceeded the officer’s
statutory authority but did not violate the Constitution cannot give rise to a
Bivens claim.
Although the Court’s conclusion that qualified immunity, not absolute
immunity, applies to suits seeking state tort remedies for conduct in
violation of the Constitution is clear enough from the foregoing parts of its
analysis, the Court removed all doubt in a later footnote addressing that
very question. After discussing the Court’s earlier holding in Scheuer v.
Rhodes that high-level state executive officials enjoy only a qualified immunity
from claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,285 Justice White wrote for the Court in
Butz:
The Government argued in Bivens that the plaintiff should be relegated
to his traditional remedy at state law. “In this scheme the Fourth Amendment would serve merely to limit the extent to which the agents could defend the state law tort suit by asserting that their actions were a valid
exercise of federal power: if the agents were shown to have violated the
Fourth Amendment, such a defense would be lost to them and they would
stand before the state law merely as private individuals.” Although, as this
281
282
283
284
285

Id.
Id.
See id. at 490-96.
See id. at 495.
See Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 247-48 (1974) (“[A] qualified immunity is available
to officers of the executive branch of [state] government . . . .”).
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passage makes clear, traditional doctrine did not accord immunity to officials who transgressed constitutional limits, we believe that federal officials
sued by such traditional means should similarly be entitled to a Scheuer immunity.286

The Court here was specifically addressing claims brought against federal
officials on a common law tort theory, which, as it explained, and as we
discussed in Part II, were the “traditional” means of obtaining damages
against federal officials who had violated the Constitution. This footnote
confirms the conclusions we reached above regarding the availability of state
tort suits post-Bivens: neither Bivens itself nor any decisions after it eliminated such claims. The footnote also shows that, as late as 1978, the Court
viewed the immunity issue in such “traditional” suits against federal officials
who had violated the Constitution as a choice between qualified immunity
and no immunity at all. In Butz, the Court opted for qualified immunity.
The only ambiguity in the above analysis is whether the views the Court
expressed in Butz regarding the scope of the immunity enjoyed by federal
officials in state tort suits alleging constitutional violations were dicta or
holding. The Court’s reasoning in deciding that the Bivens claims were only
subject to a qualified immunity extends equally to state tort suits alleging
unconstitutional conduct. The inapplicability of absolute immunity in
Bivens claims was deduced from the broader proposition that such immunity
does not apply when the officer exceeds his authority. As the Court has
often said, a decision’s holding encompasses the legal propositions that
formed part of the Court’s reasoning in reaching its judgment in the case.287
On the other hand, in another footnote, the Court seemed to limit its
holding to “constitutional claims.”288 As noted above, the plaintiff in Butz
brought both state tort claims as well as Bivens claims. After noting that
both the District Court and the Court of Appeals in Butz had focused on
the “constitutional claims,” the Supreme Court wrote that “[t]he argument
before us . . . has focused on respondent’s constitutional claims, and our
holding is so limited.”289 Even if the state law claims were not technically
before the Court, however, the fact remains that the Court derived its
holding regarding Bivens claims from a broader principle applicable to any
claims alleging conduct by federal officials exceeding their authority. Thus,
286
287

438 U.S. at 507 n.34 (citation omitted).
See, e.g., Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 67 (1996) (“When an opinion
issues for the Court, it is not only the result but also those portions of the opinion necessary to
that result by which we are bound.”).
288 Butz, 438 U.S. at 495 n.22.
289 Id.
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in leaving open the scope of the immunity enjoyed by federal officials from
state law suits alleging constitutional violations, the Court was likely
leaving open whether such officials were entitled to qualified immunity or
no immunity at all—the options the Court referred to in the other footnote
discussed above.290 In any event, if the views expressed by the Court in Butz
are dicta rather than holdings, they are reasoned dicta regarding the very
question under discussion. Butz was the Supreme Court’s last word on the
scope of federal officials’ immunity from state tort claims alleging constitutional violations before the Westfall decision and then the Westfall Act. The
Court could hardly have stated more clearly that the immunity enjoyed by
federal officials in such circumstances was, at best, a qualified one.291
As noted, the Butz Court did not resolve the scope of the immunity enjoyed by federal officials if no violation of federal law was alleged. That
issue appears to have been settled, albeit indirectly, a few years later in
Harlow v. Fitzgerald.292 The Court in Harlow self-consciously refashioned
the qualified immunity enjoyed by federal executive officials, such that they
are immune from liability to the extent that they do not violate clearly
established federal law.293 Although the Court did not discuss suits against
federal officials under state tort law, it is clear after Harlow that such a suit
can succeed only if the official has actually violated federal law. A tort suit
of the kind involved in Barr or Spalding, where no violation of federal law
was alleged, can never meet the qualified immunity standard articulated in
Harlow, because there can never be a violation of “clearly established”
federal law if there is no allegation that federal law was violated in the first
place.
290
291

Id. at 507 n.34.
The Butz Court noted elsewhere that, “[u]nless the complaint states a compensable claim
for relief under the Federal Constitution, it should not survive a motion to dismiss.” Id. at 507-08.
We do not think the Court can be taken to be saying here that nonfederal causes of action were
wholly unavailable against federal officials based on their unconstitutional conduct. The latter
claim is directly contradicted by the Court’s statement, in a footnote coming just a few lines
before, that federal officials sued by “traditional means” (meaning through common law rights of
action) should enjoy qualified immunity. Id. at 507 n.34. In our view, the Court’s statement about
motions to dismiss was directed at a different point—i.e., why, despite the Court’s rejection of
absolute immunity, “[i]nsubstantial” Bivens claims “can be quickly terminated by federal courts.”
Id. at 507; see also Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 682-83 (1946) (noting the rule of prior cases that a
claim may be dismissed for want of jurisdiction when it “clearly appears to be immaterial and
made solely for the purpose of obtaining jurisdiction or where such a claim is wholly insubstantial
and frivolous”).
292 457 U.S. 800 (1982).
293 See id. at 818 (“[G]overnment officials performing discretionary functions[] generally are
shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.”).
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So understood, Harlow’s new formulation of “qualified” immunity confirms that federal officials performing discretionary functions actually enjoy
absolute immunity from state tort suits in the absence of an allegation that
the official violated federal law. But, except in cases implicating specific
executive functions, where the suit alleges a violation of the Constitution or
other federal law, the immunity of the federal official is a qualified one,
protecting the officer only if the federal law that he violated was not clearly
established.
IV. THE WESTFALL ACT
The nature of the Bivens question as a choice between a federal or a state
source for the right of action against federal officials for constitutional
violations—and the error of the lower courts in cases like Arar in posing the
question as “Bivens or nothing”294—would be rather clear-cut were it not for
Congress’s enactment of the Westfall Act in 1988.295 As noted above, the
prevailing understanding of the Westfall Act, now endorsed by the Supreme
Court, is that it preempts all nonfederal remedies against federal employees
acting within the scope of their employment, including nonfederal remedies
for constitutional violations.296
In our view, the Westfall Act can be read as preserving not only Bivens
actions but also state law remedies against federal officials who have violated
the Constitution. If so, then the choice before a court deciding whether to
recognize a Bivens claim continues to be between a federal and a state
remedial regime, and the national security concerns that drove the court in
Arar to decline to recognize a Bivens claim should actually cut in favor of a
federal remedial regime.
However, we recognize that the Westfall Act has come to be read as
preempting all nonfederal remedies against federal officials acting within
the scope of their employment. In our view, however, if the Westfall Act is
interpreted this way, it also rules out the courts of appeals’ recent “hesitant”
approach to the recognition of Bivens claims. Indeed, the Act, so construed,
provides substantial support for a robust approach to the recognition of
Bivens claims.
Because the Westfall Act was an amendment to the FTCA, this Part
opens with a brief survey of the history of that statute and describes the

294
295

See supra Introduction & Section I.A.
Westfall Act, Pub. L. No. 100-694, 102 Stat. 4563 (1988) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C. (2006)).
296 See supra text accompanying note 23.
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enactment of the Westfall Act and the statute’s interaction with the rest of
the FTCA. It then explains why the Westfall Act does not support the
radical transformation of the Bivens question reflected in cases like Arar.
A. The FTCA, Common Law Remedies, and the Westfall Act
Others have carefully explored the background of the FTCA,297 as well
as its legislative history and jurisprudence,298 and so we keep our discussion
brief.
The FTCA for the first time waived the sovereign immunity of the federal government for most nonmaritime torts.299 To that end, the FTCA as
enacted in 1946 authorized civil actions against the United States for
monetary relief “on account of damage to or loss of property or on account
of personal injury or death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or
omission of any employee of the Government while acting within the scope
of his office or employment,” under circumstances in which “a private
person[] would be liable to the claimant . . . in accordance with the law of
the place where the act or omission occurred.”300
As originally enacted, the FTCA expressly exempted intentional torts.301
But neither the original statute, as enacted eight years after Erie, nor any of
its many amendments between 1947 and 1970, purported to affect the
availability of state tort remedies against individual federal officers. In 1974,
after (and arguably in light of) Bivens, Congress authorized a remedy
against the United States for certain intentional torts committed by federal
297 Federal Tort Claims Act, Pub. L. No. 79-601, tit. IV, ch. 753, 60 Stat. 812, 842-47 (1946)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.).
298 See, e.g., GREGORY C. SISK, LITIGATION WITH THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT: CASES
AND MATERIALS 160-336 (2000) (providing relevant case law, questions, and commentary to
explain the background and application of the FTCA).
299 In the Tucker Act of 1887, Congress expressly conferred jurisdiction upon the federal
district courts for claims (not exceeding $10,000) against the United States arising under contract
or “not sounding in tort.” Act of Mar. 3, 1887, ch. 359, §§ 1-2, 24 Stat. 505, 505 (current version at
28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(2)). In 1920, Congress expanded the government’s liability to encompass claims
arising out of admiralty or maritime torts involving merchant vessels or tugboats owned by the
federal government. See Act of Mar. 9, 1920, ch. 95, §§ 1-3, 41 Stat. 525, 525-26; see also Act of
Mar. 3, 1925, ch. 428, 43 Stat. 1112, 1112 (expanding the 1920 Act to include damages caused by
public vessels of the United States). It was not until the FTCA that Congress otherwise provided
for governmental liability in tort.
300 Federal Tort Claims Act § 410(a), 60 Stat. at 842-44 (current version at 28 U.S.C.
§ 1346(b)(1)).
301 Id. § 421(h), 60 Stat. at 845-46 (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h)). Section 421(h)
exempted “[a]ny claim arising out of assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, malicious
prosecution, abuse of process, libel, slander, misrepresentation, deceit, or interference with
contract rights.” Id.
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law enforcement officers.302 As Professors Pfander and Baltmanis have
explained, the Ninety-Third Congress “deliberately retained the right of
individuals to sue government officers for constitutional torts and rejected
proposed legislation from the Department of Justice that would have
substituted the government as a defendant on such claims.”303 The Supreme
Court confirmed this view in 1980, when it concluded in Carlson that, “when
Congress amended [the] FTCA in 1974 . . . the congressional comments
accompanying that amendment made it crystal clear that Congress view[ed]
[the] FTCA and Bivens as parallel, complementary causes of action.”304
What was just as true during the same time period was that state law
remedies against federal officers also remained available, subject to any
defenses or immunities supplied by federal law.305
Practically, then, had an individual in Arar’s position attempted to pursue
relief between 1974 and 1988 against the federal officers who had mistreated
him, he could have proceeded simultaneously along three paths: (1) an
FTCA claim against the United States, to the extent that he sought relief
for intentional torts committed by law enforcement officers that fell outside
the FTCA’s discretionary function exception (including any such claim
grounded in the Constitution);306 (2) a Bivens claim against the officers, to
the extent that he sought relief for a violation of his constitutional rights
(and special factors did not counsel hesitation); and (3) state law tort claims

302 See Act of Mar. 16, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-253, 88 Stat. 50 (amending the FTCA to permit
suits for “assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, abuse of process, or malicious prosecution” against “investigative or law enforcement officers”).
303 Pfander & Baltmanis, supra note 22, at 131; see also id. at 133 (“In [rejecting the DOJ’s
proposal], members of Congress made clear that the Bivens action was to survive the expansion of
government liability for law enforcement torts. The federal courts quickly confirmed this
conclusion.”).
304 Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 19-20 (1980).
305 For a discussion of official immunity and state secrets privilege, see supra text accompanying
notes 82-84, 95-100 & 115-27, and Section III.C. Cf. Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500,
504-06 (1988) (recognizing a federal common law defense for federal contractors for certain
activities approved by federal officials in the exercise of discretionary functions); Saleh v. Titan
Corp., 580 F.3d 1, 5-9 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (extending federal contractor defense to certain activities
related to “combatant activities”); In re Katrina Canal Breaches Litig., 620 F.3d 455, 459-60 (5th
Cir. 2010) (describing the three-part test given in Boyle to determine whether federal law preempts
state tort law remedies).
306 See, e.g., Thames Shipyard & Repair Co. v. United States, 350 F.3d 247, 254 (1st Cir.
2003) (holding that the discretionary function exception does not encompass actions by government agents that are “unconstitutional, proscribed by statute, or exceed the scope of an official’s
authority”); see also Sutton v. United States, 819 F.2d 1289, 1293 (5th Cir. 1987) (“[W]e have not
hesitated to conclude that [an] action does not fall within the discretionary function [exception] of
§ 2680(a) when governmental agents exceed the scope of their authority as designated by statute
or the Constitution.”).
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directly against the relevant officers. Different defenses may have made
recovery difficult under any or all of these theories, but all three causes of
action could have been pursued simultaneously.
In its 1988 decision in Westfall v. Erwin, the Supreme Court held that
federal officials could be sued on a state tort theory for claims not alleging a
constitutional violation.307 The Court unanimously rejected the argument
that absolute immunity shielded federal officers from all state tort liability
so long as the officers were acting within the scope of their employment.308
As Justice Marshall concluded for a unanimous Court, immunity would be
available, at most, if the officer was acting within the scope of his official
duties and his conduct was “discretionary in nature.”309 The availability of a
state law cause of action was taken for granted.
Congress responded by enacting the Federal Employees Liability Reform
and Tort Compensation Act of 1988 (which, for obvious reasons, became
known to posterity as the Westfall Act). Among other things, section 5 of
the Westfall Act expressly provided that an FTCA suit was the “exclusive”
remedy for conduct covered by the statute, thereby preempting claims that
might otherwise have been pursued under state law.310 Because of the limits
on recovery under the FTCA, the Westfall Act had the effect of displacing
state remedies in favor of no remedy against the government whatsoever in at
least some cases. To take just four (of many) examples, the FTCA does not
encompass (1) claims for intentional torts committed by non–law enforcement officers;311 (2) claims arising out of a federal officer’s performance of a
discretionary function;312 (3) claims arising in a foreign country;313 or (4)
claims arising out of, or incident to, military service.314 And even where the
FTCA encompasses a particular tort claim, the statute requires administrative exhaustion;315 only provides for a nonjury trial;316 caps attorneys’ fees;317
and bars punitive damages318 and prejudgment interest.319 Thus, both

307 484 U.S. 292, 296-98 (1988), superseded by statute, Westfall Act, Pub. L. No. 100-694, § 5,
102 Stat. 4563, 4564 (1988) (amending 28 U.S.C. § 2679(b)).
308 Id.
309 Id.
310 Id. § 5, 102 Stat. at 4564 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2679(b)(1) (2006)).
311 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h).
312 Id. § 2680(a).
313 Id. § 2680(k).
314 Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 146 (1950).
315 28 U.S.C. § 2675.
316 Id. § 2402.
317 Id. § 2678.
318 Id. § 2674.
319 Id.
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substantively and procedurally, the effect of the Westfall Act is to narrow
the universe of (and scope of recovery for) tort claims that individuals can
pursue for injuries caused by federal officials.
As relevant here, though, the statute also included a critical caveat exempting from section 5’s exclusivity provision any civil action against a
federal officer “which is brought for a violation of the Constitution of the
United States.”320 All agree that this language preserved Bivens claims. The
harder question is whether it preserved only Bivens claims.
B. Two Alternate Readings of the Westfall Act
The court in Arar assumed the unavailability of state tort remedies, perhaps because of the Westfall Act.321 At the same time, the court applied a
“remarkably low” standard in determining whether special factors counseled
nonrecognition of a Bivens claim. This standard reflects the view that
recognition of a Bivens claim would constitute illegitimate judicial lawmaking.
In the paragraphs that follow, we show that the combination of the unavailability of state tort remedies and a reluctant approach to recognizing Bivens
claims conflicts with Congress’s intent in enacting the exemption provided
by section 5 of the Westfall Act. Fidelity to Congress’s intent as expressed
in the statute’s text and legislative history requires either an interpretation
of the Westfall Act as preserving state tort remedies for constitutional
violations by federal officials or a far more receptive approach to recognition
of Bivens claims against federal officials (as distinguished from federal
contractors) than is evident in cases like Arar.
1. Preserving State Constitutional Tort Remedies
Although the Supreme Court in Minneci v. Pollard appears to have endorsed a reading of the Westfall Act that would preclude state tort remedies
against federal officials acting within the scope of their employment, the
Court did not give the interpretive question the scrutiny that it deserves.
Before Pollard, the Supreme Court’s decisions were equivocal on the point.
In Hui v. Castaneda the Court referred to the section 5 exception in passing
as the “Bivens exception.”322 On the other hand, in Wilkie v. Robbins, a case
decided after the enactment of the Westfall Act, the Court assumed the
continued availability of common law tort remedies against federal officials

320
321
322

Id. § 2679(b)(2)(A).
See supra notes 38-43, 107-14 and accompanying text.
130 S. Ct. 1845, 1853 (2010).
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alleged to have violated the Constitution.323 Since the Court in Wilkie relied
on the availability of such claims in determining that the recognition of a
Bivens claim in that case was unnecessary, its views on this point cannot be
dismissed as dictum. Professors Pfander and Baltmanis suggest that the
Court in Wilkie was simply “mistaken[]” on this point.324 It is, of course,
possible that the Court overlooked the Westfall Act, but such a reading of a
Supreme Court decision is disfavored.325 If the Court did construe the
Westfall Act to preserve state law remedies in cases alleging constitutional
violations by federal officials, it was on solid ground in doing so.
As noted above, the provision of the Westfall Act containing the socalled Bivens exception does not mention Bivens. Instead, it refers generally
to civil actions “brought for a violation of the Constitution of the United
States.”326 This language is broad enough to cover state law remedies for
constitutional violations, thus exempting them from section 5’s preemption
of civil remedies against federal officials. On this view, section 5 would
preempt state law remedies in cases like Westfall itself, where there were no
allegations of unconstitutional conduct. In other words, on this reading, the
Westfall Act preempts most state tort claims against federal officers but
leaves intact constitutional tort claims against federal officers, whether the
remedy is provided by federal or state law.
This reading is supported by the accompanying House Report, which
makes clear that the Act “would not affect the ability of victims of constitutional torts to seek personal redress from Federal employees who allegedly
violate their Constitutional rights.”327 Reading the exception to preserve the
state law remedies that previously existed would be the most direct way to
give effect to this intent. After all, as shown in Part II, common law actions
had been the standard vehicle for obtaining damages from federal officials
who violated the Constitution since early in our history, and, as shown in
Part III, such remedies remained available in the period between the Bivens
decision and the enactment of the Westfall Act. Removing such remedies
would acutely and severely “affect” the remedial rights of victims of constitutional violations by federal officials.
In our view, the available alternative readings of this text are less plausible. On one such alternative view, a common law claim is not a claim
323
324
325

See 551 U.S. 537, 551 (2007); see also supra text accompanying notes 221-22.
Pfander & Baltmanis, supra note 22, at 128.
The Federal Tort Claims Act was brought to the Court’s attention in both parties’ briefs
in Wilkie. See Brief for Petitioners at 9, Wilkie, 551 U.S. 537 (No. 06-219), 2007 WL 128587; Brief
for Respondent at 40-41, Wilkie, 551 U.S. 537 (No. 06-219), 2007 WL 550926.
326 28 U.S.C. § 2679(b)(2)(a) (2006).
327 H.R. REP. NO. 100-700, at 6 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5945, 5949-50.
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“brought for a violation of the Constitution” even if it alleges a constitutional violation. Such claims, the argument would go, are “brought” to
obtain compensation for certain interests protected by state law. The
Constitution enters into such cases in order to defeat a defense of official
justification, but the affirmative remedy compensates for injury to interests
protected by state law, not for constitutional injuries. On this view, the
overlap between common law interests and constitutional interests is
fortuitous and does not transform a suit seeking compensation for injuries
to common law interests into a suit “brought for a violation of the Constitution.” We might call this the “well-pleaded complaint” reading of section 5’s
exemption, as it relies on the fact that the Constitution comes into the case
by way of replication in order to deny that such claims are “for” a constitutional violation.328
We believe that the well-pleaded complaint interpretation is less faithful
to the statutory text than the alternative. By referring to suits “brought for a
violation of the Constitution,” the exemption’s text appears to ask the court
to identify the purpose for which the plaintiff initiated the suit. In cases
where the defendant’s conduct violates the Constitution as well as common
law interests, the plaintiff’s purpose in bringing a state law tort action will
likely be to compensate for both the common law and the constitutional
injuries. An approach that turns on the plaintiff’s actual purpose in bringing
the claim would thus usually encompass common law claims in cases where
the defendant has violated the Constitution.
A proponent of the “well-pleaded complaint” approach might respond
that the exemption cannot turn on the plaintiff’s purpose in bringing the
claim—a subjective test inappropriate in this context—but should turn
instead on the legislature’s purpose in creating the cause of action. On this
view, a cause of action is brought “for” a violation of the Constitution if its
raison d’être is to compensate the plaintiff for constitutional violations. A
common law claim for trespass would, under this theory, not be brought
“for” a violation of the Constitution because it exists to compensate for
injury to certain common law interests and only sometimes happens to
involve constitutional violations as well.
There are several problems with such an interpretation. First, it strains
the statutory language, which alludes to the purpose for which the action
was “brought,” not the purpose for which the cause of action was created.
Second, the dichotomy between constitutional interests and common law
interests that underlies this distinction will often prove to be a false one:

328

Cf. Louisville & Nashville R.R. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149, 152 (1908).
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constitutional provisions such as the Fourth Amendment were designed, at
least in part, to protect interests also protected by the common law. Indeed,
Solicitor General Griswold argued to the Court in Bivens that the protection of these common law interests was the Fourth Amendment’s sole
purpose.329 The Court disagreed, but it did not deny that protection of
common law interests in privacy was among its purposes.330 To deny that a
trespass action against an official who has infringed rights of privacy
through conduct that violates the Constitution is a claim “for a violation of
the Constitution” would bring us full circle.
Third, even under the narrowest plausible construction, the exemption
would nevertheless encompass some state law actions. Recall that the “action
on the statute” has long been recognized as a common law claim.331 Such an
action is literally “brought for” a violation of the Constitution even if one
construes that phrase to encompass only actions whose purpose is to remedy
constitutional violations. For similar reasons, a converse-1983 action of the
sort advocated by Professor Amar would also survive under this narrow
construction of the exemption.332 It is true that some states may not recognize one or either of these causes of action, but the possibility that some
states may recognize them is sufficient to establish the lack of fit between
the Arar court’s analysis and its decision not to recognize a Bivens action.333
As long as some states recognize these actions, or even just reserve the
possibility of recognizing them, a decision not to recognize a Bivens claim
will not succeed in protecting the national security–related interests cited
by the Arar court in reaching its decision.334
We think that reading section 5’s exemption to preserve state law remedies for conduct by federal officials in violation of the Constitution is more
faithful to the statute’s text. Even if it were not, however, the statute is
susceptible to that interpretation. Because this reading of the exemption
would be the most direct way to give effect to Congress’s intent to preserve
the remedies then available to victims of constitutional torts, it is preferable
to an interpretation that would take away such remedies.
Additionally, this interpretation is preferable because it would avoid,
rather than provoke, constitutional problems, which is doubly appropriate
329 See 403 U.S. 388, 394 (1971) (noting “respondents’ argument that the Fourth Amendment
serves only as a limitation on federal defenses to a state law claim” (emphasis added)).
330 See id.
331 See supra notes 136-43 and accompanying text.
332 See supra note 130. However, special state remedies for constitutional violations by federal
officials may violate nondiscrimination doctrine. See supra notes 130-32 and accompanying text.
333 See supra notes 41-43 and accompanying text.
334 See Arar v. Ashcroft, 585 F.3d 559, 575 (2d Cir. 2009) (en banc).
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in interpreting the Westfall Act’s exemption. First, avoiding such problems
was evidently Congress’s purpose in including an exemption for claims
implicating the Constitution. Second, and independently, the constitutional
avoidance canon favors an interpretation that would avoid, rather than
provoke, constitutional questions.335 Here, the avoidance canon and Congress’s intent converge in favor of interpreting the exemption to encompass
state law remedies for constitutional violations by federal officials.
This is not the place to address fully the circumstances in which the
Constitution requires a damages remedy for federal officials’ violation of the
Constitution. For present purposes, it should suffice to note that the claim
that the Constitution requires such remedies in at least some circumstances
is a substantial one. To this end, we recall that it was central to the argument of Richard Nixon’s Solicitor General in Bivens against recognition of a
federal cause of action that the state tort remedy was the one contemplated
by the Framers.336 That the Constitution requires the availability of state
tort remedies (or an adequate substitute), at least in certain circumstances,
has been defended by prominent scholars writing both before337 and after338

335 See, e.g., Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 347 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (“It is not the habit of the Court to decide questions of a constitutional nature unless
absolutely necessary to a decision of the case.” (citation omitted)); see also Edward J. DeBartolo
Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575 (1988) (“[W]here an
otherwise acceptable construction of a statute would raise serious constitutional problems, the
Court will construe the statute to avoid such problems unless such construction is plainly contrary
to the intent of Congress.”); NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chi., 440 U.S. 490, 500 (1979) (“[A]n
Act of Congress ought not be construed to violate the Constitution if any other possible construction remains available.”); cf. Bowen v. Mich. Acad. of Family Physicians, 476 U.S. 667, 681 n.12
(1986) (“Our disposition avoids the ‘serious constitutional question’ that would arise if we
construed [the statute in question] to deny a judicial forum for claims arising under [the act in
question].”). In Bartlett v. Bowen, the D.C. Circuit explained,

[I]t has become something of a time-honored tradition for the Supreme Court and
lower federal courts to find that Congress did not intend to preclude altogether judicial review of constitutional claims in light of the serious due process concerns that
such preclusion would raise. These cases recognize and seek to accommodate the
venerable line of Supreme Court cases that casts doubt on the constitutionality of
congressional preclusion of judicial review of constitutional claims.
816 F.2d 695, 699-700 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (footnote omitted).
336 See supra notes 178-81. That Solicitor General was noted constitutional scholar and longtime dean of Harvard Law School, Erwin Griswold, “a lifelong Republican with a background of
Midwest conservatism.” Dennis Hevesi, Erwin Griswold of Harvard, Ex-Solicitor General, 90, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 20, 1994, at 58.
337 See, e.g., Hill, supra note 132, at 1153; Katz, supra note 136, at 52; see also Henry M. Hart,
Jr., The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARV.
L. REV. 1362, 1401 (1953) (“In the scheme of the Constitution, [state courts] are the primary
guarantors of constitutional rights, and in many cases they may be the ultimate ones.”).
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Bivens. Moreover, numerous Supreme Court cases establish that the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause sometimes requires a damages
remedy (or a substitute remedy against the government) against state
officials who violate federal law.339 A similar analysis would appear to apply
to federal officers via the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.340
338 See, e.g., Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, supra note 130, at 1485-86 (“Few propositions of law are as basic today . . . as the ancient legal maxim [that w]here there is a right, there
should be a remedy.”); Susan Bandes, Reinventing Bivens: The Self-Executing Constitution, 68 S.
CAL. L. REV. 289, 337 (1995) (arguing that “in the absence of effective congressional remedies, the
courts are not only empowered but obligated to craft a broad range of remedies on their own”);
Gene R. Nichol, Bivens, Chilicky, and Constitutional Damages Claims, 75 VA. L. REV. 1117, 1154
(1989) (“The judiciary’s obligation—whether federal or state—to decide cases arising under the
Constitution embraces and demands the implementation of effective remedies.”); Woolhandler,
supra note 147, at 120-21. As Richard Fallon, Jr. and Daniel Meltzer explain,

Within our constitutional tradition, . . . the Marbury dictum [that there must be a
remedy for every right] reflects just one of two principles supporting remedies for
constitutional violations. Another principle, whose focus is more structural, demands
a system of constitutional remedies adequate to keep government generally within
the bounds of law. Both principles sometimes permit accommodation of competing
interests, but in different ways. The Marbury principle that calls for individually
effective remediation can sometimes be outweighed; the principle requiring an overall system of remedies that is effective in maintaining a regime of lawful government
is more unyielding in its own terms, but can tolerate the denial of particular remedies, and sometimes of individual redress.
Richard H. Fallon, Jr. & Daniel J. Meltzer, New Law, Non-Retroactivity, and Constitutional
Remedies, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1731, 1778-79 (1991); accord Carlos Manuel Vázquez, What Is Eleventh
Amendment Immunity?, 106 YALE L.J. 1683, 1800 (1997).
339 E.g., Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 643
(1999) (holding that a due process violation sometimes occurs where the state intentionally
infringes patents and fails to provide an adequate remedy); McKesson Corp. v. Div. of Alcoholic
Beverages & Tobacco, 496 U.S. 18, 36 (1990) (holding that the Due Process Clause is sometimes
violated where state denies refund for unconstitutional taxes); Ward v. Love County, 253 U.S. 17,
24 (1920); see also Carlos Manuel Vázquez, Sovereign Immunity, Due Process, and the Alden Trilogy,
109 YALE L.J. 1927, 1944-47 (2000) (discussing recognition in Florida Prepaid that the Due Process
Clause requires a retrospective remedy in certain circumstances).
Indeed, the Due Process Clause sometimes requires a damage remedy against a government
official when there has been an unlawful deprivation of liberty or property, even when the
Constitution itself was not violated. See Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 125-26 (1990) (holding
that the Due Process Clause sometimes requires damages remedy for unlawful deprivations of
liberty); Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 537, 544 (1981) (holding that the Due Process Clause
sometimes requires damage remedy for unlawful deprivations of property), overruled on other
grounds by Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1998). We take no position on whether the Westfall
Act’s exemption of suits “brought for a violation of the Constitution” should be read to exempt
cases in which the Constitution requires a damage remedy but where there was no underlying
constitutional violation. The canon of avoidance would suggest so, but the statutory language
extends only to cases in which the suit is brought for a violation of the Constitution. Even if the
exemption does not cover such a case, however, the victim should be able to maintain a suit
against the official by arguing that the Westfall Act’s elimination of his state tort claim is
unconstitutional. For an argument that the constitutionally required remedy for violation of the

576

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

[Vol. 161: 509

Of course, to the extent that the Constitution requires the availability of
a damage remedy, it is probably within Congress’s power to immunize
federal officials from personal liability if it substitutes a remedy against the
federal government itself. But it is far from clear that the remedy provided
by the FTCA suffices to meet constitutional requirements, given the
exemptions and exceptions noted above.341
One could perhaps argue that, in light of the Westfall Act, the FTCA’s
exceptions should be construed with an eye toward ensuring the availability
of any remedies required by the Constitution.342 But this approach would
risk distorting longstanding case law regarding the scope of these exceptions. Moreover, it would require the courts to resolve the constitutional
issue in each case, whereas the approach suggested here would avoid those
difficult questions. The latter approach is more faithful to Congress’s intent,
since the text and legislative history of the Westfall Act indicate that
Congress sought to address the constitutional question by excluding claims
implicating the Constitution from the scope of the Act altogether.343
The constitutional issues could also, of course, be channeled into the
Bivens analysis. The Constitution is presumably indifferent as to whether
the required damage remedy is provided by state or federal law, and for
obvious reasons a federal remedy seems preferable in most contexts. One
could thus interpret the Westfall Act as repealing state law remedies against
federal officials and implicitly instructing the courts to ensure the availability of any constitutionally required damages remedies by means of
Bivens claims. This approach too, however, would require the courts routinely

Constitution should be understood to have its basis in the Supremacy Clause rather than the Due
Process Clause, see Vázquez, supra note 338, at 1777-85.
340 We recognize that immunity doctrines frequently prevent recovery of damages against
federal and state officials who violate the Constitution. We do not contend that the Constitution
requires a remedy for every violation. But we do think that there is a substantial constitutional
argument that the Constitution sometimes requires a damages remedy for constitutional violations
in circumstances in which the FTCA would not provide one. Since the official immunity doctrine
would bar a remedy under both federal or state law, it suffices for purposes of the constitutional
avoidance argument that the Constitution requires a damages remedy for some violations of
clearly established constitutional law in contexts in which the FTCA does not provide a substitute
remedy against the government.
341 See supra text accompanying notes 311-19.
342 Thus, some courts have held that the discretionary function exception does not apply to
constitutional claims. See, e.g., Castro v. United States, 560 F.3d 381, 390 (5th Cir. 2009) (“While
it is well-recognized that violations of constitutional mandates are not actionable under the FTCA,
the occurrence of such a violation would involve the performance of a non-discretionary function
for jurisdictional purposes, if the constitutional tort is also cognizable as an intentional tort under
state law.” (citation omitted)).
343 See supra note 320 and accompanying text; supra Section IV.B.
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to confront difficult constitutional questions. As noted, Congress appears to
have intended to avoid, not provoke, such questions.
We recognize that the availability of state tort remedies may not always
suffice to satisfy constitutional requirements. Still, a reading of the Westfall
Act’s exemption as preserving state law remedies for constitutional violations by federal officials is more compatible with Congress’s intent to avoid
constitutional questions than an interpretation that takes these state law
remedies away.
In sum, the Westfall Act could be read to preserve not just Bivens claims
but also state tort remedies in cases alleging a violation of the Constitution
by federal officials. Such a reading would be more faithful to Congress’s
intent to preserve the remedies available to victims of constitutional
violations by federal officials than is the alternative. And it would avoid
rather than provoke constitutional problems, as Congress intended and as
the avoidance canon requires.
2. Preserving Only Bivens Claims
As already noted, however, the Supreme Court in Pollard endorsed a
broad reading of the Westfall Act’s preemptive scope. This interpretation,
in which the Westfall Act has the effect of preempting all civil actions
against federal officials except Bivens claims, is a plausible, if not the best,
reading of the statutory text. If the Westfall Act is to be read as preempting
all nonfederal remedies against federal officials, however, we think that it
also rules out the hesitant approach to the recognition of Bivens actions
applied by the court in Arar. Indeed, we think that the statute, so construed,
affirmatively supports a more receptive approach to the recognition of
Bivens claims against federal officials than is evident even in the Supreme
Court’s most recent decisions. These conclusions follow from three interrelated arguments.
a. Congress’s Intent to Preserve the Remedies Available to Victims of
Constitutional Violations
As noted in the preceding section, the House Report expresses
Congress’s intent to leave unaffected “the ability of victims of constitutional
torts to seek redress” for their injuries.344 Consistent with this intent, the
statutory text preserves “actions” which are “brought for a violation of the

344

H.R. REP. NO. 100-700, at 6 (1988).
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Constitution.”345 As discussed above, this language is best read to preserve
state tort remedies for violations of the Constitution by federal officials. If
the Westfall Act is to be read to preempt all such remedies, however, then
giving effect to Congress’s intent to preserve the ability of victims of
constitutional torts to seek redress for their injuries requires that the
formerly available state tort remedies now be available as federal remedies.
The most straightforward way to give effect to Congress’s intent not to
narrow the ability of victims of constitutional violations to seek redress for
their violations would be simply to apply the tort laws of the various states,
including their choice of law rules. Doing so, however, would vitiate one of
the clearest advantages of a federal remedial regime over a state law remedial
regime: the elimination of the need for courts and federal officials to
contend with the vagaries of state tort law. We thus prefer a post–Westfall
Act approach to Bivens claims under which the action would be uniform
throughout the nation. However, in keeping with Congress’s intent to
preserve previously available remedies, the courts should presume the
availability of the remedies that most states make available for analogous
injuries caused by private individuals. A Bivens cause of action should thus
be available at a minimum in the situations in which the common law would
generally have provided a tort remedy, such as in cases involving assault,
trespass, false imprisonment, and the like.
It might well be preferable to avoid the need to consult state tort law
even to this extent. We think the courts would be justified in simply
presuming the availability of a damages remedy for violation of constitutional
rights and channeling all possible reasons for limiting or denying such
claims into the immunity, privilege, or preemption analyses. The arguments
discussed below would support a post–Westfall Act approach to Bivens that
recognizes the availability of a damage remedy unless Congress has provided
an adequate alternative remedial scheme—subject, of course, to any defenses
of immunity, privilege, or preemption. Such an approach would be consistent with, if not required by, Congress’s intent to preserve the redress
available to victims of constitutional torts before the Westfall Act’s enactment. It would also correct the wrong turn the courts took in the wake of
Erie by treating the pre-Erie “general law” of remedies for constitutional
violations by federal officials as state law rather than federal common law.346
An approach that would deny a Bivens remedy in circumstances in which a

345 Westfall Act, Pub. L. No. 100-694, § 5, 102 Stat. 4563, 4564 (1988) (amending 28 U.S.C.
§ 2679(b)).
346 See supra text accompanying notes 153-65.
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common law remedy would previously have been available, on the other
hand, would be inconsistent with congressional intent.
b. Congress’s Intent to Preserve the Bivens Action As It Then Stood
A broad availability of a Bivens action is also affirmatively supported by
Congress’s intent in enacting the Westfall Act to preserve the Bivens action
as it then stood. For the reasons discussed in the previous parts, the Arar
approach to the Bivens question constitutes a drastic narrowing of the
availability of the Bivens action. Before the Westfall Act, a “special factor[]
counselling hesitation” was a reason to prefer a state law remedial regime or
an alternative federal remedial scheme provided by Congress.347 Reasons to
deny any remedy at all—such as the national security and state secrets
concerns that motivated the decision in Arar—would have been relevant at
most to defenses such as immunity, privilege, or preemption. In the latter
context, the courts’ concerns would have had to do much heavier lifting. A
reluctance to engage in judicial lawmaking would not have justified denial
of relief on such grounds. The “remarkably low” standard applied by the
Arar court would have been applicable only to a decision to relegate the
plaintiff to common law remedies.
Consistent with Congress’s intent not to narrow Bivens, the concept of
“special factors counselling hesitation” should continue to be confined to
reasons to relegate victims of constitutional violations to another actually
available remedial regime. Reasons for denying plaintiffs any remedy at all
should continue to be considered solely in connection with defenses such as
immunity, privilege, or preemption. If a “special factor[] counselling
hesitation” is a reason to prefer another available remedial regime, then the
Westfall Act’s preemption of state tort remedies should serve to make it
easier to find a Bivens remedy, as the statute takes away one of the principal
alternative remedial regimes. The preemption of state tort remedies would
leave only alternative federal remedies provided for by Congress (excluding
the FTCA itself, which Congress clearly made nonpreemptive of Bivens
claims) as the sole alternative remedial regimes. Thus, after the Westfall
Act, a special factor counseling hesitation to recognize a Bivens claim should
be solely a reason to prefer a separate existing federal remedial regime.

347 Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 396
(1971); see supra Part I.
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c. Avoidance of Constitutional Questions
As discussed above, a reading of the Westfall Act as preempting state
tort remedies without creating a substitute would raise constitutional
concerns. To the extent the Constitution requires a damage remedy, it is
presumably indifferent as to whether the remedy is provided as a matter of
state or federal law. Consequently, constitutional concerns would be avoided
if the Westfall Act were construed to make the remedies previously available
as state tort remedies now available as federal remedies. Thus, the canon of
avoidance and Congress’s obvious intent to avoid raising constitutional
questions both support an interpretation of the Westfall Act as making
available as federal remedies at least those remedies that were previously
available under state tort law.
*

*

*

In sum, the Westfall Act should eliminate the courts’ hesitant approach
to recognizing Bivens actions one way or the other. As discussed earlier, this
hesitancy is based on the view that, in our constitutional system, it is the
role of Congress, not the courts, to make law. Those who object to federal
common lawmaking do so because, in their view, permitting the courts to
make preemptive federal law circumvents the Constitution’s carefully
crafted procedures for displacing state law. If the Westfall Act is interpreted
as removing state tort remedies against federal officials acting within the
scope of their employment, then the preemption of state tort remedies will
have been accomplished by Congress through the usual bicameralism and
presentment process for preempting state law.
But this preemption was coupled with Congress’s intent to preserve
then-available remedies for constitutional violations and, in particular, its
intent to preserve Bivens as it then stood. The question for the courts is thus
now one of statutory interpretation rather than pure judicial common
lawmaking. If Congress had decided that there should be no damage
remedies against federal officials, then the courts would be required to give
effect to that decision, subject to constitutional limitations. Instead, Congress left in place Bivens actions against federal officials and expressed an
intent to preserve then-available remedies. Under these circumstances,
courts recognizing Bivens actions for federal officials’ violations of constitutional norms would not be usurping Congress’s role, but merely giving
effect to congressional legislation.
A Bivens skeptic might respond that the Bivens action that Congress left
in place in 1988 was a severely restricted one, as the Court had already
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begun retrenching from the receptive approach to recognizing Bivens
actions that had prevailed a decade before. As we have already shown,
however, the pre-1988 decisions declining to recognize Bivens actions did so
in deference to an alternative federal remedial scheme crafted by Congress.
A few more recent decisions (Malesko, Pollard) have declined to recognize a
Bivens action against federal contractors on the ground that state tort
remedies against such actors provided adequate deterrence and compensation. For reasons already discussed, we do not think that the Court’s
analysis in the latter cases would have required the same conclusion for suits
against federal officials if the Westfall Act had not preempted state tort
suits against such officials. To the contrary, we think the availability of state
remedies should in many respects make the courts less hesitant to recognize
a Bivens claim against federal officials.348
But the more important point is that, at the time of the Westfall Act’s
enactment, the Court’s decisions declining to recognize a Bivens action did
so in deference to another existing remedial scheme, or in rare cases in favor
of an affirmative congressional decision to deny a remedy.349 They did not
reflect a judicial judgment that there should be no remedy at all, nor a
judicial determination that the Constitution established a default rule of no
damages remedy. To the contrary, the default rule that existed at the time
of the Westfall Act’s enactment was that state tort remedies were available.
Indeed, as discussed above, there is a substantial argument that damages
for constitutional violations are sometimes constitutionally required. The
Westfall Act’s exemption of “suits brought for a violation of the Constitution” appears to reflect Congress’s recognition of the constitutional dimensions of this issue. Read in this light, the decisions in Malesko and Pollard
supply strong additional support for our reading of the Westfall Act. In
those cases, the Court regarded the availability of state tort remedies as a
reason to decline to recognize a Bivens claim against privately run prisons and
their employees. In Pollard, the Court specifically distinguished suits against

348 In addition to making national security concerns irrelevant to the Bivens question (as
opposed to possible defenses), recognition that state remedies would in any event be available
means that finding a Bivens action against federal officials would not increase the federal courts’
caseload, given the right of such officials to remove on the basis of a federal defense. Recognition
of a Bivens action against contractors would increase the federal caseload. The increased caseload
for federal contractors potentially outweighs the benefits of a single uniform federal cause of
action more closely tailored to the constitutional interests as stake. See supra notes 14-15 and
accompanying text.
349 See supra subsection III.B.2.
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federal contractors from suits against federal employees on this ground.350 If
the availability of state tort remedies against federal contractors is a reason
to decline to recognize a Bivens claim, then the Westfall Act’s elimination of
such remedies against federal employees, coupled with Congress’s intent to
preserve remedies for constitutional violations and to avoid constitutional
questions, cuts strongly in favor of recognition of a federal cause of action.
In any event, before the Westfall Act, concerns such as the ones that
motivated the decision in Arar would not have grounded a decision declining to recognize a Bivens claim. Congress’s decision to preserve the thenprevailing approach to Bivens supports a post–Westfall Act approach to
Bivens under which such factors continue to be relevant only to the defenses
of immunity, privilege, or preemption, and not to the existence vel non of a
Bivens claim.
V. CONCLUSION
The lower courts in recent decisions have approached the Bivens question in a way that deviates sharply from how the Supreme Court itself has
approached that question. Rather than seeing the choice before them as
“Bivens or state law,” they have posed the question as “Bivens or nothing.”
Moreover, they have combined this “Bivens or nothing” approach with a
“remarkably low” standard for declining to recognize a Bivens claim, thereby
virtually guaranteeing that Bivens itself will amount to nothing. The
combination of the “Bivens or nothing” approach and the “remarkably low”
standard for declining to recognize a Bivens claim has resulted in the denial
of a remedy for constitutional violations producing even physical injuries of
the sort which have long and uncontroversially been remedied at common
law.
This Article has shown that this revised approach is supported neither
by the Supreme Court’s post-Bivens decisions nor by Congress’s enactment
of the Westfall Act. The statute exempts suits “brought for a violation of
the Constitution”—an exemption designed to leave unaffected the ability of
victims of constitutional torts to seek redress from the federal officials who
caused their injuries. This exemption could have been read to leave in place
state law remedies for injuries caused by the unconstitutional acts of federal
officials. The Supreme Court in Pollard has instead read the Westfall Act to
preempt all state tort remedies against federal officials acting within the
350 Minecci v. Pollard, 132 S. Ct. 617, 623 (2012); see also supra note 16 (noting that, if constitutional need for a damages remedy is recognized, absence of state remedies cuts in favor of
finding a federal remedy).
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scope of their employment. If the Westfall Act does preempt all such
remedies, however, it also rules out the hesitant approach to recognition of
Bivens claims reflected in cases like Arar. Congress’s elimination of state
tort remedies, combined with its intent to (a) preserve the remedies available
to victims of constitutional violations, (b) leave Bivens as it found it, and (c)
avoid rather than provoke constitutional problems, supports a far more
receptive approach to Bivens claims than is reflected in cases like Arar, or
indeed in the Supreme Court’s own recent Bivens cases. Courts confronting
suits implicating sensitive national security and/or military concerns have
other tools available to them if they believe that relief should be barred. But
to use the appropriate tools would require far more of a principled justification for judicial intervention than the faux judicial restraint exemplified by
their decisions not to recognize Bivens remedies.

